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ABSTRACT

Payab, Mohammad I. M.S.B.C.M., Purdue University, August 2014. Post-Conflict
Reconstruction: Impediments and Challenges in the Process of Sustainable
Reconstruction and Development in Post-2014 Afghanistan. Major Professor: Kirk Alter.

Armed conflicts have left numerous marks on the history of mankind and still
continue to do so. They have resulted in considerable damage to the social and physical
fabric of the society. Millions of people both in the past and present have been suffering
from the consequences of this unfortunate man-made disaster. Yet we see a continuing
trend that seems to be resistant to any change despite efforts on a global level. This study
sets out to understand the nature of reconstruction and development after armed conflicts
with a focus on Afghanistan. After more than a decade of expended efforts, billions of
dollars and sacrificed lives, desired results and set objectives have not been achieved by
the international community and the Afghan government. This process of rebuilding
Afghanistan seems to be a non-integrated effort on the part of the international
community and the Afghan government, which has resulted in a process of development
and reconstruction that is unsustainable, especially after the withdrawal of the
international forces in 2014. The aim of this study is to identify and understand the nature
and complexity of the challenges and impediments in this process. It attempts to

x
catalogue and discuss the problems and obstacles in this process of reconstruction &
development by establishing a conceptual framework of the main issues.
Keywords: Afghanistan, Post-conflict reconstruction & development, Sustainable,
Impediments
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

“Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate;
only love can do that. Hate multiplies hate, violence multiplies violence, and toughness
multiplies toughness in a descending spiral of destruction...The chain reaction of evil -hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars -- must be broken, or we shall be plunged
into the dark abyss of annihilation.”
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)

1.1

Background

Contrary to the common belief, the end of Cold War did not result in a global
peace by putting a halt to the proxy wars. The following period witnessed a series of new
and bitter civil, ethnic, and religious wars. They have been quite destructive and have
caused physical, social, and economic losses (Hasic, 2004). From 1946 to 2001 there
were 225 armed conflicts (Gleditsch, et al, 2002). During this time, the period from 1989
to 1999 has been the most intense producing some 110 armed conflicts in 73 locations
(Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2000). These armed conflicts have disrupted and/or
destroyed the society at all levels – from social to economic to physical to technological.
The conflicts in Africa, the Americas, Europe, and Asia have been characterized by
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targeting not just combatants but also civilians. This practice could also be observed in
some of the other conflicts in history; however this has become a common war tactic
specifically in the last half of the twentieth century. These conflicts have increased
sectarian and ethnic violence and undermined the authority of the civil government. One
can point to a number of these conflicts that have lasted for years and ended in unstable
peace, sometimes still followed by periodic clashes (Weiss Fagen, 1995). The genocide
in Rwanda and the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia in Africa; the conflicts in Kosovo,
Serbia and Chechnya in Europe; the prolonged Palestinian and the current Syrian conflict
in the Middle East are some that could be mentioned here. Figure 1.1 shows the number
of deaths caused by the armed conflicts from 1970 to 1994 in 42 countries, representing
some 44% of the world population, which resulted in the loss of more than 12 million
lives (Haughton, 1998).

Figure 1.1. Death rates in most severely war-torn countries 1970-1994
(Source: J. Haughton, The Reconstruction of War-Torn Economies, Harvard 1998.)
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Conflicts have devastated a number of countries in the recent past. It has resulted
in the complete destruction of cities (Grozny), prolonged urban warfare (Beirut),
extended siege (Sarajevo), displacement of entire populations (Kosovo), ethnic cleansing
(Bosnia and Herzegovina), and throwing back of countries to the middle ages
(Afghanistan) (Hasic, 2004). This destruction is followed by a process of rehabilitation
activities entailing provision of humanitarian needs, physical restoration, political
restructuring, economic regeneration, reconciliation, and setting a framework for
sustainable development (Barakat and MacGinty, 2002). This process requires structured
planning. Contrary to armed conflicts, which result in a process of negative change,
planning aims to achieve goal driven changes through coordination of activities.
“Planning is about problem solving, about shaping the future; it is about improving the
quality of life. All of these aspects lie at the core of post-conflict reconstruction” (Hasic,
2004).

Conflict

Emergency
Response &
Reconstruction

Long-term
Development

Figure 1.2. Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Process
The reconstruction plan of a conflict affected state is set out by the international
community and organizations in agreement with the representatives of the conflict state
as the conflict comes to an end. The donor community and development agencies – the
World Bank, United Nations, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
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Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Department for International
Development (DFID) and so forth – often under the guidance of the United Nations begin
the reconstruction and emergency relief activities as soon as the conflict ends. Haughton
(1998) observes that the activities of the international community and development
agencies focus on four areas: political reconstruction (moving to elections), support for
security (retraining the police force), humanitarian relief (food) and reconstruction of
physical infrastructure (water services, electricity and housing). The international
community and development agencies believe that once peace has been brought to a
conflict affected state; all efforts should be made to prevent a recurrence of another
conflict. This approach of the international community implies that peace building is a
requirement for development. This is an essential condition that must be prioritized over
other relief and recovery activities (Hasic, 2004).
This study focuses on Afghanistan which has been a stage for armed conflicts for
more than three decades. It attempts to identify and understand the difficulties and
challenges that have been a blockade in the process of sustainable reconstruction and
development in the past decade; and bring to light the major problems and impediments
faced by this process after the 2014 withdrawal of the international forces from
Afghanistan.

1.2

Significance

Armed conflicts cause extensive damage to the economic, social, and physical
systems of a country. Armed conflicts are a major constraint in development (Hasic,
2004). The international community has been involved in the reconstruction and
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development of Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban in 2001. Since then billions
of dollars have been expended in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Common
sense would suggest that with the presence of the international community and the aid
from many donor states and organizations, the situation should have ameliorated.
However, there has not been as much progress as either the international community or
the Afghans themselves had hoped for.
Afghanistan remains one of the poorest, least developed countries in the world.
Afghanistan will not meet its Millennium Development Goal targets, even on an
extended time frame. Unemployment is currently around 30%. Over half the population
lives in poverty, a third lacks enough to eat, and 40% of Afghan children are
underweight. Two out of every ten children born in a rural Afghan area will die before
their fifth birthday. Nearly five out of ten people do not have regular access to clean
drinking water. Life expectancy is just 47 years. Over 80% of Afghans do not have
access to reliable electricity (HM Government, 2009). Furthermore, with each passing
day an increase in attacks from the insurgent groups has been observed. Between 2002
and 2007 the number of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks rose by nearly
6000%, and annual international military fatalities more than tripled (Barakat and Zyck,
2009 ).
Both the international community and the government have been immensely
criticized by the Afghan public for their inability to achieve better results in the
reconstruction and development of the country. One question that can be raised is why inspite of all the efforts by the international community and the state institutions, desired
results are not achieved. Despite the support of many countries and organizations,

6
Afghanistan is perceived to be heading towards a failure. Thus, the urge to understand the
underlying roots and causes, significance and characteristics of the challenges and
impediments is felt. This understanding would better enable the involved actors in the
recovery process to avoid the different blockades and create a strategy and set of policies
that would result in better outcomes. Such policies could ensure stability and
development in the political, economic, social, educational, and infrastructural sectors
which could prevent a relapse into violence.

1.3

Statement of Purpose

The rebuilding of Afghanistan could be seen as a process of non-integrated efforts
lacking shared-vision carried out by the international community and state institutions.
Such a lack of coordination has resulted in an ineffective recovery and development
process which could push Afghanistan into another phase of violence and calamity after
the withdrawal of the international forces in 2014. The overall goal of this study is to
contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of post-conflict reconstruction and
development. The objective of this work is to identify the major factors affecting the
process of sustainable reconstruction and development in the post-2014 Afghanistan.

1.4

Research Questions

This study is intended to address the following research questions:
•

What are the major factors affecting the process of sustainable reconstruction and
development in the post-2014 Afghanistan?

7
•

What are the underlying issues impeding the success of Afghanistan’s
reconstruction and development program?

•

In the light of the finding s of this study, what measures could be taken to
improve the process of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan?

1.5

Research Design

The research tools utilized for this study are the Delphi technique and case
studies. The Delphi technique is a qualitative method that gathers data from sources
considered expert in their respective fields. This research method was selected because of
the complex nature of this subject and the lack of comprehensive data available. Each of
the questions presented to the participants was intended to reveal the different aspects of
this subject and the connections they have with each other. Therefore, this approach
seemed to be the best method to answer the questions posed in this research and have the
potential to shed further light on this topic based on the practical experience of people
who are involved in the process of reconstruction and development, in particular in
Afghanistan.
The case studies method analyzes actual cases within specific settings to
understand a specific problem or issue within a given context. The cases studied were of
actual projects implemented in Afghanistan. Each case was carefully analyzed to identify
the different issues experienced from project conception to completion. Further, this
approach was adopted to reinforce the findings of the Delphi technique.
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1.6

Disciplinary Lens

The curiosity that led the author of this study to pose the aforementioned research
questions is his experience. The author of this study is a graduate student in the field of
Building Construction Management. He has worked in different capacities in the
construction industry of Afghanistan. The challenges he experienced and observed in the
process of reconstruction and development while working in Afghanistan has shaped this
study.

1.7

Assumptions

The ideal underlying assumptions for this study are that after the withdrawal of
the international forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the situation will not deviate towards
deterioration but rather melioration. Since corruption and insecurity are two major
variables that could turn the situation to better or worse, it is assumed that the upcoming
elections of 2014 would result in further peace and stability with clear accountability and
transparency within the state institutions. In this regard, it is assumed that the ongoing
reconciliation and peace talks with the insurgent groups will result in a productive
outcome. Such an outcome could assist in preparing the ground for tackling issues such
as education, gender, social equity, health, human rights, and others in the rural regions
of Afghanistan. Furthermore, it is assumed that the international community will remain
committed to their financial and technical support to Afghanistan after 2014 as pledged in
the Kabul conference in 2010 and Tokyo conference in 2012.
However, it would be unrealistic to assume that what the Afghan government
with the assistance of more than 42 countries and other international organizations could
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not achieve in 12 years could do it in a matter of a few years all the while when most of
the international community will withdraw from Afghanistan after 2014. Therefore,
realistically speaking, the overall situation of Afghanistan may improve but only
gradually. It could take decades to fight corruption and establish accountability and
transparency in all public and private institutions. The peace-talk between the Afghan
government, the international community, and the Taliban, having failed once, has shown
no progress for months, leaving the security situation as doubtful as before. Thus, it
would be a while before peace and stability could be observed in Afghanistan given the
uncertainties present on the ground.

1.8

Limitations

Limitations refer to restrictions in the study beyond the researchers’ control
(Rudestam and Newton, 2001). The field of post-conflict reconstruction is still a
developing one and there is no clear and established theoretical foundation or strict
conceptual and operational framework for analyzing these kinds of situations (Hasic,
2004). Due to certain restrictions, the author could not go to the field for data collection.
As a result, data collection took place via electronic means of communication – mainly
email. This might have resulted in the author not being able to observe the subjects’ facial
expressions, language tones and other bodily gestures in response to certain questions
which could have proved to be valuable while analyzing the results. Further, some of the
subjects due to the nature of this study might not have responded to the author’s
questions to the full extent of their knowledge because of the confidentiality and
sensitivity related to some of the issues. Similarly, some of the individuals approached
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for participation in this study might not have been able to participate due to either
personal or official reasons. Some of the data used in this study has been from sources
published by other researchers which could be less reliable, outdated and different among
sources. Further, the project data required for this study was limited and not available on
the databases of some organizations for general public use. This lack of project data
could bias the results as the data available might not be completely representing the
whole range of issues on this subject.
1.9

Delimitations

Delimitations imply limitations imposed deliberately on the research design
(Rudestam and Newton, 2001). This study is delimited to the reconstruction and
development of post-conflict states, in particular Afghanistan. In this regard, extensive
cross country comparisons with other post-conflict states from Europe, Asia, Africa, and
the Americas could not be done due to the sheer amount of literature available and the
limited availability of time. Therefore, the findings of this study may only be applicable
to Afghanistan and those countries/regions that share similar situations and
circumstances.

1.10 Definitions
Post-conflict recovery – due to the complex and multifaceted nature of this term and the
multiple disciplines involved therein – engineering, architecture, education,
medicine, etc. – it is difficult to narrow its definition to a singular term. However,
by its aims and objectives, it could be defined as a process to reactivate the
economic and social development to create a peaceful environment to prevent a
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relapse into violence. This definition may be widely agreeable to; however, it may
be subject to change in the context of varying level of crisis and geographical
regions (Barakat and Zyck, 2009).
Post-conflict reconstruction – the World Bank’s definition of post-conflict reconstruction
focuses on the needs for “the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of
society” and the “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning
peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law.”
(World Bank, 1998). However, Hamre and Sullivan argue that besides the above
definition provided by the World Bank, “post-conflict reconstruction includes
providing and enhancing not only social and economic well-being and governance
and the rule of law but also other elements of justice and reconciliation and, very
centrally, security” (Hamre and Sullivan, 2002).
Post-conflict stabilization – in the context of post-conflict states, stabilization refers to the
“establishment of basic security, with humanitarian activities serving as force
protection and public diplomacy, rather than for more comprehensive and
customarily civilian domains such as governance and socioeconomic
development” (Barakat and Zyck, 2009).
Post-conflict societies – by revelation, “post-conflict societies are societies in which
rebellion had proved to be feasible” (Collier, et al, 2008).
Sustainable construction and development – sustainability is defined as, “that which is
capable of being sustained” and addresses three key areas – economic, social,
environmental. Sustainable construction and development as defined in the
Brundtland Report is construction and development that “meets the needs of the
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present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their
own needs” (WCED, 1987). Within the context of this study it would refer to
construction and development that is sustainable by the government and people of
Afghanistan.
Armed conflict – an armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that
concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between
two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two
parties, at least one has to be the government of a state” (Themner & Wallensteen,
2012).
Civil war – Collier et al, defines four main characteristics of a civil war. “It requires that
there is organized military action and that at least 1,000 battle-deaths resulted. In
order to distinguish wars from genocides, massacres and pogroms, there has to be
effective resistance – at least 5% of the deaths have been inflicted by the weaker
party.” (Collier, et al, 2008).
Peace building – a “set of transitional reconstruction activities undertaken in a postwar
phase, designed to lay the foundation for longer-term developments such as
democratization, economic development and social justice.” (Suhrke, Harpviken,
& Strand, 2002). It could also be defined as, “actions undertaken by national or
international actors to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Rocha
Menocal, 2011).
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State building - state building refers to the “set of actions undertaken by national and/or
international actors to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions where
these have been seriously eroded or are missing” (Rocha Menocal, 2011).
Political settlement - a “political settlement is the expression of a common understanding,
usually forged among elites, about how political power is to be organized and
exercised, and about how the nature of the relationship between state and society
is to be articulated” (Rocha Menocal, 2011).
Factors and Issues – it should be noted that within the context of this study, factors and
issues are used interchangeably.

1.11 Audience of this Study
This study is intended to serve as a source of information about the different
aspects and relevant problems faced in the process of reconstruction and development to
the author, the researchers and professionals involved in this field and process, and the
general populace, particularly of Afghanistan, interested in learning about this subject. It
is hoped that the findings of this research will prove to be valuable – no matter to how
small a group of people – in understanding the impact of some of these issues on this
process and the development of new ideas that could lead to improvements and efficiency
in the process of reconstruction and development resulting in better and sustainable
outcomes.
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1.12 Chapter Summary
The intensity and frequency of the armed conflicts have increased since WWII.
Some have been interstate while most of them have been intrastate conflicts. These
conflicts have caused partial or complete state failures resulting in the destruction of the
political, economic, social, environmental, and technological sectors.
Subsequent to this destruction is the process of recovery and reconstruction. The
international community, Non-Governmental Organizations, and donors get involved in
this process alongside the institutions of the post-conflict state. However, due to the
different political and other agendas of these actors, their efforts are not concentrated and
integrated towards recovery and reconstruction. These uncoordinated efforts result in
unsustainable practices in the reconstruction and development of the post-conflict state.
Thus the need to identify the impediments and challenges in this process are essential.
Forming a strategy and set of policies to avoid these impediments while channeling and
focusing the use of resources with structured planning towards a common goal will result
in better outcomes.
The objective of this study is to identify and bring to light the major challenges
and impediments faced by the process of sustainable reconstruction and development in
Afghanistan. However, due to the complex nature of this topic and lack of widely
available research materials, this study will be carried out with certain assumptions,
limitations, and delimitations taken into account. This will limit the findings of this study
to Afghanistan and regions with similar characteristics.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

“War is not a single catastrophic event but a devastating way of life closely
associated with chronic poverty and social injustice. Peace is not a quick fix but a
development process that begins and can be nurtured long before ceasefires are brokered,
and which needs to be sustained through years of ‘post-war recovery’”.
Dr. Barakat and Chard (2002)

2.1

Conflicts

The history of mankind has been marked by numerous conflicts. Conflicts occur
because of the differences among people. Differences in perception, perspectives, and
values lead to disagreements. These disagreements may be related to territory, economic
interests, religion, culture and ideology. Disagreements may lead to tense disputes which
may result in conflicts of different scales (Kress, 2012). Hasic states that “war, armed
conflict, violent conflict, humanitarian war, guerrilla war, ethnic violence, civilian strife
or political violence are all terms without precise definition and very often used
indiscriminately to support a specific point of view” (Hasic, 2004). However, whatever
term is used, it is certain that conflicts depress national economies and degrade many
aspects of social life (Carlton-Ford, 2009).
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Historically, the objective of a conflict has been to control territory. However, in
order to gain political control, insurgents design contemporary conflicts to disrupt
ongoing day to day life (Carlton-Ford, 2009). Conflicts of this nature target both
civilians and combatants as seen in the wars in Africa, Central America, the Balkans and
in parts of Asia (Hasic, 2004). Such disruptions affect all the sectors of a state – social,
political, economic, environmental, physical and technological.
Looking at the period from the end of Second World War (WWII) to 2011, there
have been 248 conflicts active in 153 locations worldwide (Themner & Wallensteen,
2012). Figure 2.1 shows the trend of armed conflicts since 1946. Of these 248 conflicts,
more than 140 have been civil wars. The data available puts the number of casualties to
around 20 million and the people displaced to 67 million for these wars. Comparing this
data to that of WWII, the number of casualties are almost equivalent to half with more
than double the number of people displaced (Panic, 2005). Among these conflicts, the
genocide in Rwanda was one of the most intensive killing campaigns in history. The
conflict in Caucasus resulted in the worst destruction of physical infrastructure since
WWII. The conflict in Palestine is the most prolonged conflict of all (Hasic, 2004).
The end of Cold War instilled the image of an ideal world in the minds of people.
In the absence of friction and tension between states supported by one or the other of the
world super powers – the capitalists and the communists – people began to dream. They
dreamt of an era of peace, development, prosperity and cooperation within and between
states. However, there were skeptics who feared the uprise of the ethnic and cultural
conflicts in the post-Cold War era, and it turns out they were right (Panic, 2005). From
1989 to 2011, there have been 137 armed conflicts in regions including Europe,
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Figure 2.1. Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2011
(Source: Themner & Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011, 2012)
Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Americas (Themner & Wallensteen, 2012). Table 2.1
presents the conflicts by types from 1989 to 2011. Table 2.2 presents the conflicts by
region for the same time period. In 2011, 37 armed conflicts were active in 30 locations.
This figure is substantially lower than the active 50 armed conflicts recorded in the early
1990s, while higher than the 31conflicts recorded in 2010. The increase in conflicts from
2010 to 2011 is in fact the largest increase in the number of armed conflicts between any
two years since 1990. This rise in the number of conflicts is partly due to the events
related to the Arab Spring (Themner & Wallensteen, 2012).
Although, there is no general consensus on the causes of violent conflicts among
academicians (Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2008), researchers have identified
different factors responsible for the conflicts in different parts of the world. However, due
to the varying nature of a conflict, factors relevant to a conflict in one region of the world
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may not be the same to the factors identified to a conflict in another region of the world.
Still there are some characteristics that are found to be common amongst states that have
experienced a conflict. Panic (2005) describes three of these characteristics as follows:
I.

Poverty
According to the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) over 80 percent of the states that have experienced civil
conflicts are in the bottom half of this list. The common economic characteristics shared
by these states are unemployment and economic stagnation, with economic welfare and
income security deteriorating rapidly. Over 40 – 50% of the population of these states is
ranked as poor. As a result their levels of literacy, education, health standards and life
expectancy are much lower than those of high or medium income states.
II.

Impoverishment, Inequality and Pessimism
If a state is experiencing a gradual economic growth, development, and has a fair

and just system then there would be no general feeling of civil unrest and conflict among
people. The people would be certain that the system is working fairly for the benefit of
all. However, this is not the case in many developing countries. There is a wide gap of
income equality among people which has created a feeling of insecurity internationally.
People feel less prosperous and are less optimistic about the future. This pessimism, if not
reversed, will create a cycle of impoverishment, despair, and hate among the inhabitants
of a state.
Low level of development results in invariably high level of unemployment. Since
such a situation does not affect all the sections of a society equally, it creates inequality.
As the overall effect is greater economic insecurity and dissatisfaction in the government

Table 2.1. Armed Conflicts by type and location, 1989-2011
(Source: Themner & Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011, 2012)
Level of
Conflict
Minor
War
All Conflicts
All Dyads
All Locations

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

30
13
43
62
36
2001
28
8
36
48
29

35
15
50
67
37
2002
26
6
32
45
24

39
13
52
67
38
2003
25
5
30
41
23

41
12
53
64
39
2004
25
7
32
44
24

35
10
45
57
32
2005
27
5
32
38
23

35
11
46
56
33
2006
28
5
33
46
24

34
7
41
47
31
2007
31
4
35
44
25

33
8
41
51
31
2008
32
5
37
48
27

32
7
39
54
29
2009
30
6
36
45
27

28
12
40
54
32
2010
27
4
31
39
25

26
13
39
50
31
2011
31
6
37
50
30

27
10
37
49
28
89-2011
89
48
137
279
81

Table 2.2. Armed Conflicts by region, 1989-2011
(Source: Themner & Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011, 2012)
Level of
Conflict
Europe
Middle East
Asia
Africa
Americas
All Regions

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2
4
16
12
9
43
2001
2
3
14
15
2
36

3
7
21
13
6
50
2002
1
2
12
15
2
32

7
8
15
17
5
52
2003
1
3
15
10
1
30

8
7
20
14
4
53
2004
2
3
14
10
3
32

9
7
15
11
3
45
2005
2
5
16
7
2
32

5
6
16
15
4
46
2006
1
5
15
10
2
33

5
6
16
10
4
41
2007
2
4
14
12
3
35

1
7
18
12
3
41
2008
2
4
15
13
3
37

0
4
19
14
2
39
2009
1
5
15
12
3
36

2
3
16
17
2
40
2010
1
5
12
10
3
31

3
3
15
16
2
39
2011
1
6
13
15
2
37

1
3
17
15
1
37
89-2011
23
15
39
46
14
137
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and the system, it increases political instability and risk of conflict. Such a situation
encourages immigration of highly skilled and educated labor along with the transfer of
capital. This makes it even more difficult to reverse the economic decline, thus raising the
likelihood of a conflict. Examples of states where sharp falls in income and large
increases in unemployment preceded civil wars are Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Indonesia and
Yugoslavia.
III.

Social Divisions and Political Oppression
When the economic welfare and personal survival of people are threatened, they

form alliances with people who face similar dangers to protect themselves. An
independent and developed state will not collapse if the ‘population is homogenous and
share the same roots, language and religion; equality prevails in the society and there is
no discrimination against any group of the people; every member of the society has the
same legal rights, equal access to state institutions and influence on the way they are run,
and most importantly the economic inequalities in the society are considered fair’.
If, however, there are economic inequalities and discrimination against certain
groups of the society based on race, root, or religion, then the dominant social group will
ensure to have power over key political offices and positions at all levels of the state.
This would give them control over the country’s resources, the army, the police, and
judiciary, which will result in a continued discrimination and oppression. These actions
will increase the risk of a conflict and the longer such discrimination and oppression
continues, the more violent the eventual conflict will be.
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2.2

Involvement and Policies of the International Community

A very simple question that might be asked is why the international community
should get involved in the reconstruction and recovery of failed states. There are two sets
of notions in this regard. First, such actions represent ‘rational and ethical attempts to
support “universal goods” such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and
thereby create conditions under which those who have endured conflict and disruption
can pursue the “good life”’(Gheciu & Welsh, 2009). The second view may not be clear
when looked at from a local perspective but becomes apparent when analyzed on a global
scale. There is a ‘growing recognition that weak or failed states may provide ideal
conditions to nurture terrorist networks’ (Barakat, 2009). If the failed states are left
untended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks with a global reach
along with international organized crime and drug traffickers who exploit the
dysfunctional environment. As such, failed states pose a threat to the political and
economic stability of the entire region and national interests of many developed countries
(Hamre & Sullivan, 2002). Thus, to control the threats posed by these states, the use of
military force by the international community results in damaging and destabilizing
effects on local people and institutions. The moral intuition is therefore to compensate for
unintended consequences and ensure the well-being of those affected by such actions
(Gheciu & Welsh, 2009).
Rebuilding failed states has become a priority to the international community. As
much as the international community would like to avoid involvement with the failed
states, it is a reality that has to be faced. Terrorist groups have already exploited the
vacuum of state authority in many countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Horn
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of Africa and are likely to seek further advantage. These failed or failing states have
either no longer a functioning government (Somalia), or their central government no
longer control major parts of their territory (Pakistan), or those whose central
governments can no longer provide the basic needs to their population (some African
countries) (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002).
Significant international interventions to rebuild weak or failed states is certainly
not always the answer because of the magnitude of efforts and resources involved,
however international involvement does become inevitable in many cases. When dealing
with a failed or failing state, the international community has at least eight policies to
consider. These are:
1. Do nothing in the hope that the situation will resolve itself without major
action on the part of outsiders.
2. Quarantine a failed state and monitor and intercept potential threats that
emanate from the territory.
3. Acknowledge that a failed state is no longer viable and to “carve it up” or
recognize its dissolution into smaller pieces.
4. Seek to integrate or absorb a failed state, or parts of it, into a larger entity,
whether this entity is a single state or a body.
5. Establish some sort of international transitional authority.
6. Promote some sort of a neighborhood watch system, with countries in the
region playing a central role in trying to solve or contain the problem.
7. Back one side in a given conflict and hope that it emerges as the winner and
that it can reorder the affairs of the country.
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8. Have a strategy and capacity for post-conflict reconstruction if regional
stability is to be maintained, economic development advanced, lives saved,
and transnational threats faced (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002).

2.3

Immediate Post-conflict Reconstruction Objectives

Contemporary post-war reconstruction programs have four defining features.
First, they are not only designed to reconstruct but also improve significantly the
performance of state institutions. These state institutions – promoting the rule of law,
liberal democracy, supporting civil society and open economy – reflect a vision of social
progress in a broader concept of development and modernization. Second, these
programs are increasingly standardized and endorsed by international institutions, such as
the World Bank, OECD and UN Development Program (UNDP). Third, the basic model
of reconstruction and modernization is derived from ‘Western experiences of liberal
political development and economic growth’, with ‘good governance’ as a recent addition
to this model. Fourth, inclusion of ‘cooperative national elites’ to make the model work
(Suhrke, 2007).
This reconstruction program, as simple as it may seem, when executed in a postconflict setting, results in too many and frequently contradictory political and economic
agendas due to the involvement of many international actors. As a result, a set of
expectations and objectives are imposed marginalizing the recipient state institutions and,
therefore, constitute a major threat to state sovereignty and stability (Barakat & Zyck,
2009).
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Barakat (2002) argues that two schools of thought exist concerning the timing of
reconstruction and development activities. The first is that ‘peace is a prerequisite for
reconstruction and development’. The second is that long term recovery will be feasible if
the reconstruction and development activities are initiated at an appropriate time during
the conflict. Evidence from world-wide experience supports the second theory.
Though the situation after a war could be clearly outlined however not the
situation after a conflict as various active variables continue to blur the situation. For this
reason, Barakat and Zyck (2009) have termed ‘post-conflict recovery’ as ‘mid-conflict
stabilization’. They contend that this approach not only affects the timing of intervention
but also the sectors. The early implementation of post-conflict recovery activities has
resulted in the politicization of, for instance, humanitarian assistance – including relief
and reconstruction spending. While the objective of post-conflict recovery is to maintain
peace and stability, focusing initial assistance towards the most violent areas has
produced ‘perverse incentives not only for the continuation of violence in those areas but
also for peaceful regions to permit, attract or mimic insurgent activity in hopes of
maximizing access to resources’. This has resulted in the generation of extended
insurgencies compared to the smaller scale violence at the end of the 1990s.
Some researchers within the field of social sciences have started studying manmade disasters with similar approaches as those used for the post-natural disaster
recovery and reconstruction. However, due to the intricate nature of conflicts the two
situations require completely different strategies. “Disaster relief requires both immediate
emergency action and carefully planned reconstruction. The task following conflicts is
not to reconstruct entities that have been destroyed but there is a need to create
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alternatives to those structures, as prior systems and living patterns have been severely
changed. In a post-conflict state, there are no identifiable communities to rebuild, the
political authorities that were previously in place are no longer recognized or exist, the
legal systems are nonexistent and there is often a negative attitude on the part of
government toward aid donors” (Hasic, 2004). However, this may not be the case in
every post-conflict state. As long as the state and its inhabitants exist no matter in what
condition, there will always be a community to rebuild; political authorities will get
support from at least some members of the community; and some of the people
constituting the government will have a positive attitude toward aid donors. In addition,
in some cases following a conflict, the international community and aid donors would
endeavor to return the state to status quo ante and step back when the state institutions
become operational.
Conflicts are the results of the failure of governance. In a post-conflict setting,
good governance and public administration programs must be the cornerstone of peace
building efforts (Panic, 2005). The international community should focus from the onset
on the institutional changes and policies that promote and contribute to political and
economic stability and development. Hamre & Sullivan (2002) have discussed four
important pillars, distinct yet interrelated, necessary for post-conflict reconstruction.
These are:
I.

Security
“Security addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular, creating a safe and

secure environment and developing legitimate and effective security institutions” (Hamre
& Sullivan, 2002). These institutions have the responsibility to secure the lives of
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civilians as well as the territorial integrity of the post-conflict state. Security is significant
in preventing conflicts between the dyads, warring factions, and pockets of groups trying
to create insecurity in parts of the state. Good security can pave the road to economic
development in terms of attracting national and international investments. Security is a
prerequisite to the successful achievement of goals in a post-conflict state.
II.

Justice and Reconciliation
“Justice and reconciliation addresses the need to deal with past abuses through

formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict and to
create an impartial and accountable legal system for the future, in particular, creating an
effective law enforcement apparatus, an open judicial system, fair laws, and a humane
corrections system” (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002). In a post-conflict state failing to bring the
wrongdoers to justice could provoke victims to retributive violence. Conflicts result in
atrocities against civilians as well as combatants resulting in intense feelings of
grievances, resentments, and animosities. If the problems that resulted in the conflict in
the first place are not solved and if reconciliation of warring factions are not achieved
then the future of the state will remain as bleak as its past (Panic, 2005).
To secure a lasting peace, the government and the international community have
to come to terms with the wrongdoers. If internal order is not established quickly,
lawlessness will prevail with the state institutions, especially the judiciary and the police
discredited. Therefore, the provision of internal order and security is highly prioritized as
success of the post-conflict strategy depends on it (Panic, 2005). To deal with the
wrongdoers and the groups involved in the conflict, the state and the international
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community have six options at hand - trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties,
purges, and exiles (Binningsbo, Loyle, Gates, & Elster, 2012).

III.

Social and Economic Well-being
“Social and economic well-being addresses fundamental social and economic

needs, in particular, providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the
population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable
economy, and initiating an inclusive and sustainable development program” (Hamre &
Sullivan, 2002). Social and economic development is bound to take time in post-conflict
states. The reconstruction of physical infrastructure and provision of social services are
critical for the revival of the economic activity. However, none of the problems in a postconflict state can be solved in isolation.
Sustained development could contribute to reducing the risk of conflict. To
achieve major improvements in economic conditions, decisions have to be made early in
the process. Two such important decisions are economic development and poverty
reduction. To achieve these goals five economic policies are to be followed strictly
(Panic, 2005).
1. Achieve high levels of employment and job security in order to give everyone
a stake in their country’s future.
2. Sustain the rate of growth to maintain high levels of employment and job
security in the long run.
3. Keep prices stable so that the rate of inflation does not make it impossible to
achieve the other objectives.
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4. Ensure that gains from economic progress are distributed fairly and that no
one should live below a socially acceptable standard.
5. Sustain external balance to enable the country to preserve its economic
sovereignty, thus allowing it to pursue the other four goals.
However, the means and methods to achieve these economic objectives will have
to remain flexible and pragmatic.
IV.

Governance and Participation
“Governance and participation addresses the need to create legitimate, effective

political and administrative institutions and participatory processes, in particular,
establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public-sector
management and administration, and ensuring the active and open participation of civil
society in the formulation of the country’s government and its policies” (Hamre &
Sullivan, 2002). Good governance includes ‘sensible economic and social policies,
democratic decision making, governmental transparency and financial accountability,
creation of a marketfriendly environment for development, measures to combat
corruption, respect for the rule of law, human rights, and freedom of press and
expression’ (Barakat & Chard, 2002).
As the United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan has noted, “All these tasks –
humantarian, military, political, social, and economic – are interconnected, and the
people engaged in them need to work closely together. We cannot expect lasting success
in any of them unless we pursue all of them at once as part of a single coherent strategy.
If the resources are lacking for any one of them, all the others may turn out to have been
pursued in vain.” (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002)
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2.4

The Development Challenge

Reconstruction and development in a post-conflict setting is of utmost importance
and are determinants of the prosperous or bleak future of the post-conflict state. But, does
development in a post-conflict context have the same meaning as that in a developed
country? Development may have different definitions for experts of different fields and
the context it is used. In the first half of the twentieth century, the scholarly literature
assumed development was about using the state to lead the process of modernizing the
society and raise its income. However, contemporary development is less concerned
about the level of involvement of the state in the development process. The consensus is
for the state to be “better” involved in this process, and thus of significance is the
administrative and technical capacity of the public sector (Rapley, 2007). It could,
therefore, be contended that what development means is dependent on what it is supposed
to achieve. However, in all cases, the objective of development is the provision of more
resources and facilities to the society. It is to improve the quality of life of the people by
providing access to education & health care, employment opportunities, better living
environment and so forth. To Paul Collier (2007), “development is about giving hope to
ordinary people that their children will live in a society that has caught up with the rest of
the world.”
How can a country, especially one that has come out of a conflict in the recent
past, achieve these development objectives? There are two main types of resources that
determine the level of development in a region a) hard resources (physical resources such
as housing, infrastructures, public services, etc.), and b) soft resources (non-physical
resources such as employment, education, information, etc.). The process of
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reconstruction and development in a post-conflict state is to provide people access to both
the hard and soft resources that were lost and those resources that probably did not exist
before the conflict (Lizarralde, Johnson, & Davidson, 2010). However, provision of these
resources faces certain challenges. As mentioned earlier, the main development
challenges in a post-conflict setting can be categorized into four groups – security,
political, economic, and social. The effective tackling of these issues ensure one thing –
the growth of the state; and growth leads to development. According to Collier (2007),
73% of the people in low-income societies have been or are still in a conflict. One of the
main reasons for this is the growth rate of these countries. He states that in “absolute
terms the growth rate of these countries have been negative and in relative terms it has
been much below than the rest of the developing countries”. Experts set development
goals in these countries but they do not identify the process that could achieve these goals
effectively and completely.
The challenges in terms of growth that these countries face is what Collier (2007)
calls the ‘development traps’. These traps are:
1. The Conflict Trap
Conflict is inherent to politics and it is one of the factors to slow and/or block
growth. There are three economic characteristics that make a state more vulnerable to
conflicts – low income, slow growth, and dependence on primary commodity exports.
The lower the income of a country, the more it is likely to fall into a conflict. Slow
growth will also increase this risk of conflict. A typical low-income country has a 14%
risk of falling into a conflict in any five-year period. Any increase in the growth
percentage of the country will reduce the risk of conflict by the same amount. Similarly, a
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decrease in the growth percentage will increase the risk of conflict by the same
percentage point. Dependence on the primary commodity exports, such as oil, diamonds,
etc., significantly increases the risk of a conflict. These commodities have been found to
not just finance conflicts but in times even motivate it. One example is the ‘conflict
diamonds’, which is also known to some as the ‘blood diamonds’ of Africa. Low-income
countries that have experienced a conflict have disproportionately high risks of relapse.
2. The Natural Resource Trap
The existence of natural resources in a state is a paradoxical trap that is generally
thought of as a catalyst to prosperity, which in some cases is i.e. if a state has enough
natural resources to forget about normal economic activities, for example, Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait. However, the surplus from natural resource exports has been found to
significantly reduce growth. The export of resources in these states causes the currency to
rise in value against other currencies, leaving other export activities of the state
uncompetitive. This results in a loss of opportunities to diversify the economy which
might have been the vehicle to technological progress. Resource rich countries receiving
resource endowments have proved difficult to harness this income into growth, for
example, much of the Middle East. The income from resources can take them to middleincome countries status but to fully develop, they would need to use this wealth for
growth.
3. Landlocked with Bad Neighbors
Economists have realized over the past decade that geography of a country
matters when it comes to growth. Landlocked countries are hostages to their neighbors.
Transportation of goods to and from landlocked countries incurs much higher costs and
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this cost is directly related to the amount its coastal neighbor has spent on the transport
infrastructure. A landlocked country loses around half a percentage point in the growth
rate. However, for landlocked countries their neighbors not only serve as corridors to the
overseas markets but also directly as markets. The economic conditions of the neighbors
directly affect the economy of the landlocked country. For example, compare Switzerland
where it is surrounded by Germany, Italy, France and Austria to Uganda where it is
surrounded by Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, Somalia, Congo, and Tanzania. The growth of
neighbors benefit the growth of the landlocked countries in what is called the ‘growth
spill over’. If the neighboring countries grow by an extra one percent, the landlocked
country will grow by an extra 0.7 percent. Further, a resource-rich landlocked country
can do much better compared to resource-scarce landlocked country, as the natural
resources being valuable could be exported despite higher transport costs associated with
being landlocked – for example, Botswana, abundant in diamonds.
4. Bad Governance
Good governance and economic policies can help increase the growth rate. But no
matter what governments do, the economy cannot grow faster than 10%, which is the
ceiling growth rate. Good governance and policy can help a country grow, but only if the
growth opportunities exist. On the contrary, bad governance and policies can destroy the
economy very rapidly. It is not easy to determine whether current governance and
policies are adequate, but what societies could do is learn from failures – for instance,
China completely changed its policies after the 1960s economic crisis generating the
biggest economic success in history. However, not every leader would prefer such a
positive change. Many leaders of the world’s poorest countries are among the richest
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people of the world, so it is in their benefit to keep their people uneducated and illinformed, while practicing the politics of patronage and corruption. Reformers, who
rarely dare to make changes, are often suppressed and sometimes have to pay high price
for their efforts.
To sustain growth in order to support the development process, Collier et al.
(2003) suggest the following strategies:
1. Reduce Dependence on Primary Commodities
Dependence on the primary commodities can increase the risk of rebellion, poor
governance, and poor economic performance. Even though dependence on the primary
commodities can be detrimental, yet they could be conducive to better growth of a
country. The challenge is for the policy makers at the national and international level to
devise policies that could help in better harnessing this potential.
Diversification is one way of reducing dependence on the primary commodities
which can significantly assist the growth and stability of the economy. Three factors have
been found to reduce dependence on primary commodities – growth, aid, and policy.
Growth assists in diversifying the economy in general resulting in a reduction of the risks
of market price changes. Aid helps in reducing dependence on primary commodities as it
provides an incentive to reduce exports and improves the infrastructure activities. Good
economic policies can also significantly result in diversification. The effectiveness of
policies is measured through the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment (CPIA) rates. An increase of one point in the CPIA of a developing country
would reduce its dependence on primary commodities from 15.4 percent of the GDP to
13.8 percent.
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2. Reduce Corruption
Governments need to have transparency in using their revenues particularly that
generated from natural resources, as embezzlement of this revenue by a group of elites
could lead to the disappointment of the general public resulting in insecurity and/or
rebellion. As the information provided by the government may not be considered reliable
by the general public, a useful model here could be the formation of an alliance between
the government, the civil society, and the World Bank to make the revenue and
expenditure reports more trustworthy.
3. Cushion Adverse Shocks
Countries dependent on primary commodities may face severe negative shocks as
the prices of these commodities are generally very unstable. These shocks will damage
the medium-run growth of the country and the growth lost during this period may never
be recovered. This could result in possible conflicts. For example, during the financial
crisis of East Asia in 1998, the income of Indonesia fell by 10 percent which resulted in
an escalation of violent conflict in Aceh. The international community, thus, in this
regard will have to assist in cushioning these shocks as the governments of developing
countries generally do not have the expertise, and sometimes the political goodwill, to
“implement contractionary policies effectively”. For instance, OECD economies could
adopt trade policies that could have a sharp effect on the world prices of primary
commodities.
4. Raise Economic Growth
Faster economic growth will result in an increase in the income and promotion of
diversification. Three instruments are considered effective in raising growth – domestic
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policies, international aid, and access to global markets. It is not easy to establish what
forms good policies; however it is clear what are bad policies. No economist desires
“high and variable inflation, high trade barriers, widespread public ownership of
marketed activities, or use of public employment for patronage rather than for equitable
service delivery”. One way to determine the effectiveness of existing policies is using the
World Bank’s CPIA, as mentioned earlier. This policy rating system rates
“macroeconomic, structural, social, and public sector policies on a scale of 1 to 5”. The
higher the rating of policies, the more effective they are. The average ratings of
developing countries are 2.95 on this scale and those of successful developing countries
are 3.75, for instance Ghana and India. An increase of one point in the CPIA is associated
with an increase of 1.6 percent in the growth rate.
Aid as a development assistance is found to increase the average growth rate of
developing countries by 0.1 percentage point, if the amount of aid is increased by one
percentage point as a share of GDP. Similarly, access to global markets will improve
exports increasing the country’s foreign reserves resulting in a growth in the economy.
However, major trade reforms are required to diversify as well as increase trade.

2.5

Afghanistan: A Brief History

The modern state of Afghanistan was founded by Ahmad Shah Abdali (later to be
known as Ahmad Shah Durrani) in 1747. An influential and powerful commander in the
service of the Persian warlord Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah took control of his army and
Nadir Shah’s chest of Mughal jewels after the Shah’s assassination. Subsequently,
Ahmad Shah led to the conquest of Kandahar, Kabul, and Lahore, and then later launched
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Figure 2.2. Map of Modern Afghanistan
(Source: United Nations Cartographic Section)
a series of lucrative raids into India. He created an empire that was built out of the
collapse of three other Asian empires – the Uzbeks to the north, the Mughals to the south
and the Safavids of Persia to the west. At its height, the empire extended from Nishapur
in modern Iran through Afghanistan, the Punjab and Sindh to Kashmir and the threshold
of Mughal Delhi. Following Ahmad Shah’s dead after contracting a tumor, his son,
Timur Shah, succeeded him as the ‘Shah’ or king of the empire in 1772 (Dalrymple,
2013).
Subsequent to Timur Shah’s death in 1793, a volatile period followed as a result
of power struggle between the Sadozai and Barakzai clans. In the meantime, the British
East India Company was expanding rapidly out from its coastal factories to conquer
much of the Indian subcontinent. Feeling threatened by the Russians in the north, the
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British intervened militarily in 1838 to replace the pro-Russian Shah, Dost Mohammad,
with the then exiled Shah Shuja, more amenable to the British interests. This foreign
intervention stirred growing resentment among the Afghans leading to tribal oppositions
and eventually to the first Anglo-Afghan war which resulted in complete demise of the
British troops in 1842 (Holt, 2012).
Driven by revenge and paranoia of the growing Russian influence in Afghanistan,
the British commenced the Second Afghan War in 1878. Following a military triumph,
reprisals came swiftly as the angry occupiers rounded up rebels and hung them ten at a
time. The war caught fire again and burned brightly. At the battle of Maiwand, the British
forces suffered a devastating defeat followed by a victory at the battle of Kandahar (Holt,
2012). Following this victory the British forces withdrew soon after taking charge of
Afghanistan’s foreign affairs in exchange for protection against the Russians and Persians
and an annual subsidy. A period of friendly Afghan-British relations began during the
reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. However, after his death, his son, Amanullah Khan,
who claimed the throne started the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 to claim control of
Afghanistan’s foreign affairs from the British. The Afghans ended up the victors in this
war.
The Afghans experienced a period of peace, tranquility, and prosperity in the 20th
century. However, not long after, the former Prime Minister, Daoud Khan took charge of
the affairs of the country by overthrowing the monarchy of his cousin Zahir Shah and
declaring himself as the first President in 1973. Daoud’s modernization programs and
reforms, set in the 1960s, accelerated after the 1973 coup creating both fears and
expectations. New social groups emerged with demands for political power and distinct
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ideas of what constituted ‘progress’. Developmental change had weakened traditional
society and created new politically conscious social groups that the inflexible and later
authoritarian political system under Daoud could not accommodate. Failure to
accommodate the emerging communist and pro-Islamic movements in the political
system and the growing political polarization eventually caused the political order to
collapse. In the escalating tension between the communists and pro-Islamic supporters,
the former developed a significant following in the armed forces and captured the state in
a military supported coup in 1978 (Suhrke, 2007).
The communists with their revolutionary ambitions and the violence which the
regime unleashed saw rapidly growing resistance among the common Afghans (Suhrke,
2007). The following year, in response to increasing fears of Islamic resistance both
within Afghanistan and the newly declared Islamic Republic of Iran, the USSR invaded
the country in support of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
government.
From late 1979 until February 1989 Soviet military forces occupied Afghanistan,
during a period marked by fierce resistance from Afghan fighters, known as the
Mujahidin, backed mainly by the USA and the Pakistani intelligence agency. After nearly
a decade of occupation, the Geneva accords of 1988 led to the withdrawal of all Soviet
forces in early 1989. Despite being considered as a success, the accords had failed to
address adequately the issue of the post-occupation period and the future of governance
of Afghanistan (Barakat, 2002).
In 1992 the Mujahidin groups formed an alliance but with no united or coherent
strategy for running the government. Within months, incompatible goals and an aversion
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to power sharing between the different Mujahidin factions led to the collapse of their
coalition as a new phase in the conflict began. What began as a struggle against
occupying Soviet forces mutated into an internal power struggle as the different factions
within the Mujahidin regime fought each other. This civil war left a political vacuum
which resulted in the emergence of the Taliban towards the end of 1994. Within two
years of their emergence, the Taliban had captured the major cities of Kandahar, Herat,
and Kabul as the Mujahedin forces either fled or joined them. By mid-2001 the Taliban
controlled more than 90% of Afghanistan and the overall situation in the areas they
controlled was one of relative peace, in the sense that factional fighting had ceased
(Barakat, 2002).
It was during the Taliban rule that the Al-Qaeda set its base in Afghanistan. Large
numbers of foreign nationals, from Pakistan, Chechnya and many Arab countries, had
come to Afghanistan to undertake military training in camps run by Al-Qaeda (many of
these camps had originally been established with the assistance of western countries to
provide support to the Mujahedin). The attacks of 11 September 2001 in America,
attributed to the Al-Qaeda, led to the military campaign aimed at the overthrow of the
Taliban regime in October 2001. Within a month of this military campaign, the Taliban
forces retreated from Kabul in November 2001 (Barakat, 2002) marking the beginning of
a new phase in the history of modern Afghanistan.

2.6

Afghanistan: Post 2001

Shortly after the apparent defeat of the Taliban, talks were held about the future of
Afghanistan in Bonn from 26 November to 4 December 2001. The talks resulted in the
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establishment of an interim authority, which included a number of warlords, with Hamid
Karzai as the Chair. In addition, an Independent Commission was also established
charged with organizing an ‘Emergency Loya Jirga’ (a Pashto term, meaning a ‘Grand
Assembly of Elders’) six months after the Bonn conference. This Jirga was responsible
for the establishment of a multi-ethnic Transitional Administration to overlook the affairs
of the state until the official elections of 2004. Furthermore, a Constitutional Loya Jirga
was also established which adopted a new constitution for the country on 4 January 2004
(Barakat, 2002).

2.6.1

An Overview of the Reconstruction Program

The reconstruction program in Afghanistan initiated by the international
community was highly ambitious. ‘In its minimalist version, the aim was to eliminate
terrorist safe havens, reconstruct the state, and kick-start the economy; in its maximalist
form the plan was also to develop and modernize Afghan society’. In defining the tasks
this way and setting timetables and benchmarks for monitoring progress, the international
community was boldly challenging the formidable difficulties ahead (Suhrke, 2007). As
Barakat (2002), a well-known researcher in the field of post-war recovery and having
served as an advisor and consultant in this regard to many organizations & countries
including the UN, the World Bank, Afghanistan and so forth, rightly notes it, “the biggest
problem facing those charged with the task of Afghan reconstruction is that rebuilding
has been embarked upon not on the basis of the real and acute need to rebuild, nor as part
of a carefully planned, integrated process… on the contrary, it has been initiated as part
of a rushed ‘knee-jerk reaction’ by external actors”. However some of these external
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actors on the contrary may contend that the task of rebuilding Afghanistan has been
embarked as part of a planned process. The activities corresponding to this process, for
instance those of USAID’s, are to ‘rehabilitate the rural economy; develop financial
organizations; increase trade and export; repair the infrastructure for energy, transport,
and water services; assist in building democratic institutions; and develop the capacity of
those institutions to perform in a participatory, accountable and responsible manner’
(USAID, 2013). Thus, one could say that proper planning has been taken place in the
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan; however whether those plans have
translated in the field into what was desired is a different question.

2.6.2

Diversity of Actors

There seems to be a lack of coordination and planning among the external actors
themselves and with the government of Afghanistan which could be associated to the
interests of the various actors involved in this process. Suhrke et al (2002) states that,
“the diversity of interests among Afghan parties, and the large number of international
actors involved, suggest that the most difficult part of the peace-building effort lies
ahead”. In general, there are more than 60 countries and 20 international organizations
who have participated in the recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan (Oskarsson,
2012). Of these, the US, Japan, the UK, the European Commission (EC), the World Bank
(WB), Germany, and Canada are the major donors (Waldman, 2008).
The presence of all these international actors in Afghanistan, each following their
personal agendas and vested political, economic, social, and other interests, has resulted
in the marginalization of the legitimacy of the government. In the process of the
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provision of developmental assistance and the allocation of reconstruction initiatives,
Afghanistan has had only an observer’s status. The priorities expressed by the Afghans
have been outshined by those of the external actors. The Afghan government has only
had control of more than a fraction of its own core operating budget (Barakat & Zyck,
2010). Of the estimated $57 billion spent on the reconstruction of Afghanistan in the
period 2002-2010, only $6 billion has been channeled through the national development
budget with the full ownership of the Government (Afghan Government, 2011).
However, from the perspective of the international community, channeling a smaller
amount of funds through the government’s development budget could mean a lack of
capacity of the Afghan government and the existence of corruption. With the warlords
given share in the government and the politics of patronage a common practice, the
international community might have considered channeling more funds through the
government’s budget an ineffective way of utilizing resources for the reconstruction and
development of Afghanistan. This might have resulted in more development funds
siphoned off by the warlords.

2.6.3

Managing the Reconstruction Program

In 2002 when the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was formed, the need for
greater governmental control over the reconstruction process was recognized. This
resulted in the establishment of the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA).
However, according to the World Bank observations, ‘this unit itself required capacity
building in order to play its intended role. This left the international actors to exercise
decisive influence over the reconstruction process’ (Suhrke et al., 2002). The AACA was
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dissolved in 2003 and the functions of aid coordination and management were
incorporated into the ‘General Budget Directorate’ of Ministry of Finance (Ministry of
Finance, 2010). ‘While the international community continues to argue that the lack of
capacity justifies the circumvention of the government structures, it is important to note
that they have entrenched this lack by failing to provide adequate opportunities for
capacity development’ (Barakat et al., 2008).
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is a major funding channel
to support the rehabilitation and development efforts of the Afghan Government. It was
designed to act as a treasury for the government. ‘However, the ARTF has remained
entirely under the control of its donors and has received almost no funds from some of its
largest donors – the US and Japan. As a result of bypassing the ARTF, and the preference
for direct execution by donors through implementing partners, the Afghan government
has only had control on approximately one percent of all project-based international
assistance. While it is not necessary for the Afghan State to utilize all international
revenues itself, it should be more greatly involved in their allocation. Indeed, a more
collaborative governance would have been appropriate. This would have allowed the
international community and the Afghan government to divide and share responsibilities.
The result of not pursuing collaborative governance and the exclusion of the Afghan
government from this process has left the government disempowered having not
developed the necessary capabilities to take a leading role in the country’s recovery and
stabilization’ (Barakat et al., 2008).
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2.6.4

Funding Commitments and Management

‘Even more damaging to the effort to stabilize Afghanistan after the fall of the
Taliban was the low level of committed funding to rebuild a country laid waste by almost
three decades of war’ (T. H. Johnson & Mason, 2007). ‘On the humanitarian front, per
capita reconstruction assistance for Afghanistan is a third what was provided in Iraq and
one-twelfth given to Bosnia and Herzegovina more than a decade ago despite the
appalling lack of infrastructure, human resources, state institutions, and basic services in
Afghanistan’ (Barakat & Zyck, 2010). Furthermore, ‘international studies of peacebuilding and reconstruction packages highlight the gap between the rhetoric and pledges
of the international community and the reality in terms of delivery on the ground’
(Goodhand, 2002), which has been replicated in Afghanistan.
In the seven conferences held on the development and reconstruction of
Afghanistan in the period 2002 to 2012, a total of $63.44 billion was pledged by the
international community and donors. An additional $56 billion was pledged outside these
conferences. This is indicated in Table 2.3. However, as seen in Table 2.4, only $85.116
billion was committed off these pledges till the end of 2011, out of which only $69.723
billion was disbursed. Figure 2.4 shows the trend and amounts of the external assistance
committed and disbursed annually for the period 2002-2011.

Table 2.3. Total Pledges as of July 2012 ($billions)
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report 2012, 2012)
Tokyo
2002
5.1

Pledging Conferences for Afghanistan
Berlin London Rome Paris Chicago
2004
2006
2007
2008
2012
5.6
8.7
0.04
14
14

Tokyo
2012
16

Total
Pledges by
Conference
63.44

Supplemental
Pledges
56

Grand
Total of
Pledges
119.44
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Table 2.4. Total Commitment as of December 2011 ($millions)
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report 2012, 2012)
Donor
United States of America
Japan
European Union/European Commission
United Kingdom
Germany
Asian Development Bank
World Bank
India
Canada
Netherlands
Australia
Norway
Sweden
Italy
Denmark
United Nations
Iran
France
Turkey
Spain
Others (25 donors)
Total

2002-2011 Commitment
57,383
3,821
3,077
2,574
2,435
2,400
2,378
1,588
1,371
1,109
953
852
736
697
503
446
399
376
226
220
1,572
85,116

2002-2011 Disbursement
47,524
3,821
2,816
2,578
978
1,129
1,852
759
1,371
1,110
806
712
736
589
503
182
367
199
193
194
1,304
69,723

16.79

18
16
14
US$ BILLION

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

12.2

12
11.79

10
6.51

8
6
4
2
0

15.87

3.23

7.13

6.18

2.62

2002

2003

2004

2005

10.9

6.32

4.89

4.17
2.61

8.26

5.83

4.63
3.1

8.47

12.93

2006

COMMITMENT

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

DISBURSEMENT

Figure 2.3. Annual Commitments & Disbursements (2002-2011)
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report 2012, 2012)
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There are multiple reasons for the difference between aid commitments and
disbursements. One of the reasons is the challenging operating conditions, nominally,
insecurity. ‘Security deterioration is considered to be a major obstacle hindering project
implementation across the country’ (Ministry of Finance, 2010). However, the fact that
this much aid circumvents the government could be partly linked to ‘budget execution
problems, such as capacity constraints, procurement delays and complex budget
procedures’. Although, the government has been able to disburse over $4 billion of funds
in 2011, still the over $8 billion that has bypassed it points to the enduring lack of
capacity of the government. The donors are partly responsible for this lack of capacity as
‘sufficient funds have not been devoted to build the institutional and implementing
capacities of line ministries’. Further, another reason is corruption, which ‘remains
endemic and is compounded by limited financial oversight and weak governance’. A
major concern in this regard is ‘the lack of political will to tackle high level corruption’.
Yet, improvements have been observed in the government’s ‘public financial
management systems, fiduciary controls and regulatory framework’ (Waldman, 2008).
While the government is primarily responsible for abusing badly-needed assistance, the
international community must also share the blame. “Poorly conceived state-building
projects, the failure to enforce oversight, to properly measure outcomes rather than just
inputs and to address systemic failures in aid delivery create opportunities for corruption”
(Crisis Group, 2011) .
More than half of the total international assistance or Overseas Development
Assistance (ODA) has been invested in the security sector i.e. provision of equipment,
supplies, services, facilities, and training to the Afghan National Security Forces. The rest
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has been invested in sectors, such as Governance, Infrastructure, Agriculture and Rural
Development, Education, Health, Private Sector Development, Social Protection, and
others (Ministry of Finance, 2012).
The dispersion of the ODA, for the development of both security and non-security
sectors, takes place via two main channels of delivery:
a) Off-budget: This “support consists of assistance that bypasses the
government’s Public Finances Management System with little or no
government involvement in planning, implementation or monitoring of the
programs/projects” (Ministry of Finance, 2010).
b) On-budget: This “support consists of assistance that either has been given to
the government as bilateral support or provided through the Trust Funds. Most
such on-budget programs are government designed, implemented, and
monitored” (Ministry of Finance, 2010).
According to the government’s reports, less than 20% of the ODA has been
provided through the government’s Core Budget, whereas more than 80% has been
‘managed by the Development Partners (DP) through projects/programs implemented
parallel to those of the government’ (Ministry of Finance, 2010). Table 2.5 below shows
the total ODA provided through government budget for the period 2003 – 2011.

Table 2.5. ODA Through Government Budget, 2003-2011 ($millions)
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report 2012, 2012)
FY
Total Budget
Donor’s Contribution
Govt.’s Contribution

2003
1,620
1,238
382

2004
864
559
305

2005
1,344
918
426

2006
1,646
1,109
536

2007
2,250
1,534
715

2008
2,818
1,900
919

2009
2,731
1,662
1,069

2010
3,266
1,800
1,466

2011
4,331
2,169
2,162
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2.6.5

The Dispute

Implementation of parallel programs/projects by DPs and their implementing
partners have always been criticized by the government. Such donor-driven practices,
with no accountability to the government, do not align with programs of national priority.
The contracting and sub-contracting processes of the DPs have a negative impact on the
Afghan economy. Further, they are not conducive to building the capacity of the state
institutions (Ministry of Finance, 2010). One such structure parallel to the government is
the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) whose effectiveness and contribution to peace
and stability in Afghanistan has been frequently questioned by many researchers (Barakat
& Zyck, 2009; Waldman, 2008; Crisis Group, 2011; Ministry of Finance, 2010).
PRTs are civil-military teams with the objective to ‘extend the authority of the
central government and improve security, thereby facilitating the reconstruction process
at the provincial level’ (Ministry of Finance, 2010). PRTs are not development agencies
but are engaged in development projects. These military reconstruction bodies work as
part of a broader counter-insurgency operation aimed at winning local support for
international military forces and newly established governments (Barakat & Zyck, 2009)
through their Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Quick Impact Projects (QIP). As
such, ‘aid programs in these areas focus more on meeting narrow security objectives than
achieving nationwide development goals or building and strengthening state institutions’
(Crisis Group, 2011). In doing so, PRTs have in many cases undermined the emergence
of effective institutions of national and local government and other civil development
processes (Waldman, 2008).
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Such practices demonstrate the lack of coordination and communication between
the DPs and the government. Barakat and Zyck (2009) contend that due to the influx of
actors with distinct and often contradictory agendas, coordination will remain chaotic
which will significantly inhibit effective recovery. Further, each actor ‘brings agendas
associated with its domestic constituency, with the ideologies of its rulers and with its
desire for recognition and relevance’. Such varying agendas make it difficult for the DPs
to coordinate among themselves and with the government in a way to maximize the
efficiency and delivery of projects. According to the government, a large number of DPs
follow their own ‘aid strategies, design methods, procurement policies, and
implementation, monitoring and evaluation procedures’. Consequently, aid is fragmented
with projects duplicated in the absence of well-shared information among the DPs
resulting in unbalanced and inequitable development (Ministry of Finance, 2010).
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
‘donors often channel funds directly to implementing partners or contractors, and do not
always keep the relevant Afghan ministries informed about financial flows’. This has
resulted in the government not having information on how some $5 billion were spent
since 2001(Waldman, 2008).

2.6.6

The Aid Effect

Aid has a major impact on peace and stability. The way aid is delivered can have
a varying level of effect on development and poverty reduction. Poverty is a significant
factor in the spread of insecurity. More than a third of population lives below poverty line
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in Afghanistan (Ministry of Finance, 2012). Thus, how effectively the aid is used could
steer Afghanistan towards peace and stability or insecurity and devastation.
“While aid has undoubtedly contributed to progress in Afghanistan, a large
proportion of aid has been prescriptive and supply-driven rather than indigenous and
responding to Afghan needs. It has been heavily influenced by the political and military
objectives of donors, especially the imperative to win so called ‘hearts and minds’. It has
tended to reflect expectations in donor countries rather than what Afghan communities
want and need. Projects have too often sought to impose a preconceived idea of progress
rather than nurture, support and expand capabilities, according to Afghan preferences”
(Waldman, 2008).
Development is not a short term effort, yet much of the development aid in
Afghanistan has been appropriated to Quick Impact Projects in regions where donorcountry troops are deployed. It is unsurprising that such projects have yet to produce
sustainable results. “While there is no doubt that aid is required to address short-term,
especially humanitarian, challenges, to some extent this has come at the expense of
Afghan participation, sustainable poverty reduction, and capacity building objectives.
There has been a tendency to overlook intangible dimensions of aid, especially the
promotion of Afghan ownership, which is essential for achieving project relevance,
utility, and sustainability” (Waldman, 2008).
In this manner, much of the aid has been ineffective or wasted. Based on a
number of assessments, it has been found that ‘the impact of aid on lives remain
uncertain, particularly when assistance is shaped by stabilization goals rather than the
needs, priorities and input of the recipients’ (Crisis Group, 2011). According to the
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report, Evaluating U.S Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan (2011), the US Senate Foreign
Relations Committee stated, “The evidence that stabilization programs promote stability
in Afghanistan is limited. Some research suggests the opposite and development best
practices question the efficacy of using aid as a stabilization tool over the long run”. The
US government’s development agency (USAID), for instance, concentrates more than
half of its budget on the four most insecure provinces to achieve counter-insurgency
objectives. This approach is not only inequitable but dangerously short-sighted. Such aid
distribution disparities could be perceived as insecurity attracting more aid. Thus such
perverse incentives could attract insurgency in relative secure areas with persistent
poverty (Waldman, 2008).
Moreover, the donors spend a significant proportion of assistance on
administrative costs, purchasing goods and services, as well as highly paid advisers from
their own countries (Crisis Group, 2011). As cited in Waldman (2008) and Development
Cooperation Report (2010), according to NATO Special Civilian Representative, the
World Bank, and Oxfam about 40% of aid to Afghanistan flows back to the donor
countries as a result of these donor placed conditionalities. ‘Such operations not only
result in the loss of opportunities to generate income for the Afghan service providers and
local producers, but also make the results less cost-beneficial as the cost of both services
and goods are lower in Afghanistan than donor countries’ (Ministry of Finance, 2010).
‘Drawing somewhat on external resources is unavoidable but a large number of projects
do so to an extent which cannot be justified. As a result, international construction
contracts in Afghanistan are estimated to have just 10-15% local economic impact’
(Waldman, 2008). This practice is also against the Afghanistan Compact (2006) agreed to
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by donors in the London Conference where increased use of Afghan services and goods
are encouraged.

2.6.7

Building the Afghan Capacity

Afghanistan lost many of its skilled human resources during the three decades of
fighting and disturbances and opportunities to replenish this created gap were missing.
The educational and training institutes to prepare the Afghans to carry the responsibility
of managing the reconstruction and development of their country were either completely
destroyed or were of low standards of negligible impact. The significant change in the
government system in the past ten years with the support of the international community
provided conditions for the Afghans to continue higher education and get sufficient
knowledge and skills to build their country. But still there is an obvious shortage of
qualified experts who can make a difference.
A quarter of international aid is used to fund international consultants with the
objective to support government capacity building. While there is a need for the
government to receive technical and managerial support, however it has had a minimal
impact. Based on the review of World Bank (2007), ‘technical assistance (TA) tends to
be donor driven, and peppered around at high cost with little effective involvement from
national decision makers and only marginal impact in terms of lasting capacity building’.
Waldman (2008) notes that, ‘the total cost of each full-time expatriate consultant is in the
range of $250,000 to $500,000 a year’. At the Interior Ministry of Afghanistan, 282
foreign advisers are absorbing a total of $36 million a year (Crisis Group, 2011). In the
same report mentioned above, World Bank (2007) concludes that, ‘the widespread use of
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uncoordinated and non-strategically targeted technical assistance is neither fiscally nor
politically sustainable’. It is estimated that a total of $1.6 billion was used to fund
international TAs between the period 2002 to 2006 (World Bank, 2007). The Afghan
government on the other hand criticizes the use of these international TAs as substitutes
for civil servants being engaged in daily operations rather than on institution building.
These TAs have not been able to transfer the required knowledge and skills to Afghan
institutions thus leaving a similar vacuum after their departure which existed before their
deployment (Ministry of Finance, 2010).
A possible working model here could be the establishment of an Afghan Capacity
Development Agency. This agency should have representatives from both the Afghan
government and the international community. The agency should initially determine the
exact needs of the Afghan government at all levels and devise a capacity building
program that could train and educate the Afghan officials as required. However, this
agency should periodically evaluate the impact of this program and the changing needs of
the Afghan government and modify its modules and programs accordingly.

2.6.8 Contracting and Construction
The international community and donors committed a total of $9.24 billion to the
infrastructure sector of Afghanistan during the period 2002 – 2011; however out of this
commitment only $6.02 billion was disbursed (Ministry of Finance, 2010). Many of the
projects funded by this development aid are awarded to national and international
contractors. However, the contracting and subcontracting processes of these projects have
proved to be less effective in making these reconstruction and development projects
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sustainable. Though, the contracting and subcontracting of projects is a common norm
throughout the world, however in Afghanistan some large projects have up to five layers
of national and international subcontractors. Each layer of these contractors retain 1020%, and in some cases up to 50%, profit on any given contract (Ministry of Finance,
2010). This practice not only increases the total operational cost but also results in fewer
dollars spent on the project, compromising the quality and hence achievement of the
desired objectives.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assists Afghanistan
through the issuance of contracts, assistance instruments, and direct assistance to the
Afghan government (Hutton & Johnson, 2012). It uses contractors, also called
implementing partners, to help award and administer its contracts and grants and perform
on-site monitoring of other contractors’ activities (C. M. Johnson, 2010). USAID relies
heavily on six US contractors – inter alia, KBR, the Louis Berger Group, Chemonics
International, Bearing Point and Dyncorp International – and allocates a major portion of
its funds to them (Waldman, 2008). These contractors, absorbing aid in corporate profits,
in turn subcontract to local companies, hence increasing the overall project cost and
making it difficult to know if funds are spent as intended. For example, the construction
of a short stretch of road leading to Kabul international airport was awarded to the Louis
Berger Group by USAID in 2005 who in turn subcontracted to another construction
company. The cost of this project is reported to be $2.4 million per kilometer, at least
four times the average cost of road construction in Afghanistan, which could range
between $100,000 and $600,000 based on the terrain and region (Waldman, 2008).
Though relying on subcontractors can provide benefits, however USAID has not always
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addressed related risks – for instance conflicts of interest. Federal regulations require
enhanced oversight of contractors in situations where they provide close support to
governmental functions, however USAID has been generally unable do so (C. M.
Johnson, 2010).
USAID lacks a sufficient number of supervising personnel with work experience
in contingent regions such as Afghanistan. One of the reasons is the high turn-over rate of
USAID personnel (C. M. Johnson, 2010). This has led to poor implementation of projects
by many contractors and subcontractors, resulting in a waste of development aid. For
instance, “the Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO), another
US consultancy and services firm has implemented construction projects under a fouryear $60 million USAID alternative livelihood program in Badakhshan, most of which
are reportedly unfinished or breaking down. During their implementation between 2005
and 2009, it was reported that only one USAID staffer monitored performance on the
ground, with USAID relying on third party monitors” (Crisis Group, 2011). USAID has
acknowledged that it has limited ability to verify the accuracy and completeness of the
reports provided by contractors (Hutton & Johnson, 2012). The specific reason provided
by the USAID for this lack of monitoring and evaluation of projects and verification of
reports is the security environment of Afghanistan. The high-threat security environment
requires USAID personnel to travel with armored vehicles and armed escorts to visit
projects in much of Afghanistan. This has limited their movement and the frequency of
their visits to project sites (C. M. Johnson, 2010).
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2.6.9

Accountability

USAID programs are more prone to corruption, waste, fraud, and abuse because
of its improper execution of performance management and evaluation procedures (Hutton
& Johnson, 2012). The same could be contended about many other actors involved in the
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. There is no or only minimal
accountability for donors and their implementing partners. Donors are subject to little or
no scrutiny, as opposed to the Afghan government who is liable for 77 measurable
benchmarks based on the Afghan Compact (Waldman, 2008). Quick and visible projects
with no proper planning and coordination with all the relevant stakeholders might win the
hearts and minds of the people temporarily but sustainability and long term benefits of
these projects are questionable. ‘Donors, in their haste, have invested much aid to shortterm military objectives and timeframes, but when the drawdown begins, funding and
civilian personnel presence may rapidly decline, undermining the sustainability of
whatever construction and development that has been achieved in Afghanistan’ (Crisis
Group, 2011).

2.6.10 Development
Afghanistan has come a long way and made significant progress since 2001.
Some of the noticeable accomplishments, as shown in table 2.6, are for instance,
‘increase in the provision of access to primary health care from 8% of the population to
more than 60%.; increase in the number of children getting education in schools from 900
thousand to over 8 million; pavement of about 2000 kilometers of road cutting travel time
by 75%; increased access to electricity by 250%; provision of telecommunication
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services to over 80% of the population; carrying out of elections; increase in the per
capita GDP from $180 to over $530; increase in an average fiscal growth rate of 9%;
open media; growth in the role of women in the society with girls making 39% of the
students in schools and women emerging as successful political, business, civil, and
society leaders’ (The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2011).
Although, much has been achieved during the last decade with the assistance of
the international community, however there remains much to be achieved yet. To set on a
path of successful development, the Afghan government will have to spare no efforts to
overcome the challenges present in this process. Afghanistan currently faces three
development challenges – the conflict trap, landlocked with bad neighbors, and bad
governance. As Afghanistan is a resource rich country, it would not be far from the
present that it might also get trapped by the fourth development challenge – the natural
resource trap. Overcoming these challenges would be an uphill climb for the Afghan
government, in particular to the policymakers. Whether Afghanistan will be able to
successfully overcome these traps and join the group of successful developing countries
or continue remaining trapped and stay among the underdeveloped countries depends
primarily on the efforts of the Afghans themselves and partially on the assistance of the
international community.

Table 2.6. Afghanistan Development Indicators, 2002-2011
(Source: World Bank)
Information Detail
Population, total (million)
Population growth (annual %)
Urban population (% of total)
Population density (people per sq. km of land area)
GDP (current US$)(billion)
GDP growth (annual %)
GDP per capita (current US$)
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)
GNI (current US$)(billion)
GNI per capita (current US$)
Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)
Net ODA received per capita (current US$)
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)(million)
External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$)(billion)
Merchandise trade (% of GDP)
Refugee population by country or territory of origin (million)
Internally displaced persons (number, high estimate)(thousand)
Battle-related deaths (number of people)
Armed forces personnel, total (thousand)
Military expenditure (% of GDP)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)
Improved water source (% of population with access)
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
Internet users (per 100 people)

2002
22.2
3.93
21.1
34.0
4.1

2003
23.1
4.03
21.3
35.4
4.5
8.4
198.2
11.7

2004
24.0
3.83
21.6
36.8
5.2
1.0
220
11.2
5.0
210

2005
24.8
3.45
21.8
38.1
6.2
11.1
252.4
10.9
6.1
250

58.9
50.0

68.9
57.8

96.2
186.9

114.1
271.0

62.3
2.5
920
699
12

48.9
2.1
600
353
13
2.0
46.0
14.3
125.9
33
34
11.7
54.7
0.7
0.08

46.9
2.4
200
621
27
2.1
46.3

45.5
2.1
200
1271
27
1.7
46.6

122.7
38
34
16.4
40.9
2.2
0.10

119.4
42
35
17.2
55.4
4.3
1.22

185.9

45.8
129.2
30
33
0.1
0.005

2006
25.6
3.05
22.1
39.3
7.0
5.5
275.3
7.1
6.9
270
8.8
115.5
238.0
0.9
42.3
2.1
132
3167
51
1.7
46.9
18.9
116.3
46
35
25.7
58.1
8.8
2.10

2007
26.3
2.76
22.4
40.4
9.8
13.7
373.5
22.3
8.6
330
6.9
188.4
188.6
2.0
38.0
3.0
161
5901
51
2.4
47.2
113.4
50
37
25.6
57.6
16.0
1.9

2008
27.0
2.56
22.7
41.4
10.1
3.6
376.9
2.1
9.8
360
7.9
180.3
87.2
2.1
33.5
2.8
235
4446
94
2.1
47.5
24
109.7
50
37
34.1
59.6
26.4
1.84

2009
27.7
2.47
22.9
42.4
12.4
21.0
450.6
-2.1
12.7
460
10.5
225.0
213.6
2.4
30.5
2.8
297
5103
255.7
2.0
47.9

2010
28.3
2.46
23.2
43.5
15.9
8.4
561.2
9.4
14.3
510
11.0
226.3
75.6
2.4
35.2
3.0
352
6241
306.8
3.6
48.2

106.7
50
37
39.7
62.1
34.3
3.55

103.9
50
37
45.5
63.7
41.3
4

2011
29.1
2.46
23.5
44.6
18.0
6.9
619.5
10.6
16.6
570
11.3
230.5
83.4
2.6
34.6
2.6
456
7234
340.3
4.7
48.6
38.6
101.1
48.5
65.9
54.2
5
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2.7

Chapter Summary

Looking at the history of conflicts and the data at hand we could come to the
conclusion that the current trend of conflicts will continue in the future. Conflicts will
continue to cause casualties and displace people within and outside their respective
states. Though, there is no general agreement on the causes of conflicts, at the least
academically, however there are characteristics that are found to be common among
states that have experienced a conflict. Such characteristics are poverty,
‘impoverishment, inequality & pessimism’, and ‘social divisions & politicial oppression’.
When faced with a failing or failed state that could pose a threat to the regional stability
or the national interests of developed countries, the international community has at least
eight policies to choose from. What comes next to intervention by the international
community in these conflicts is the phase of reconstruction and development of these
states. This phase of reconstruction is to enable the state institutions and people to take
charge of their affairs. The four major areas that need to be addressed immediately after
the reconstruction phase begins are security, justice & reconcilliation, social & economic
well-being, and governance & participation.
In Afghanistan, after a decade of major security, development and humanitarian
assistance, the international community and the Afghan government has failed to achieve
a politically stable and economically viable Afghanistan. Most Afghans still live in
conditions of hardship and extreme poverty. The international aid has been prescriptive
and used by the donors based on their priorities rather than Afghan needs and
preferences. The construction and development projects have been delivered with results
and visibility in mind rather than sustainability. The aid allocated to the technical
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assistance and development of government capacity has been wasteful, donor driven and
of limited impact. State institutions remain fragile and unable to provide good
governance, deliver basic services to the majority of the population or guarantee human
security. ‘As the insurgency spreads to areas regarded as relatively safe till now, and
policy makers in Washington and other Western capital seeks a way out of an unpopular
war, the international community still lacks a coherent policy to strengthen the state
ahead of the withdrawal of most foreign forces by Decemeber 2014’ (Crisis Group,
2011).
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CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

“The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible.”
“We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created
them.”
Albert Einstein, Princeton (Lectures 1933-1945)

3.1

Theoretical Framework

The issue of sustainable reconstruction and development in Afghanistan is
influenced by many factors. Some of these factors are the ‘participatory’ approach of the
international community, the donor conditionalities, the insecurity, the lack of
coordination and planning among the different actors and organizations, and the lack of
technical capacity within the Afghan institutions. The general approach of the
international community and the donors throughout this reconstruction and recovery
phase has been a participatory rather than a ‘blue-print’ approach (Barakat & Zyck,
2009). This approach has led to a slower and less effective process of progress, recovery
and development. Models of western democracy, governance, and liberal economy
adopted have not been very effective due to the presence of different variables and
parameters, for instance cultural, security, and geopolitical, which do not fit within these
models. Incorporation of these models would have been effective if the society was
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sufficiently developed and stable. Donor conditionalities have resulted in the
organizations and people to focus more on the visible outcomes of the projects and
programs than the long-term impact and the effectiveness of the process. During aid
negotiations, conditionalities are asserted by donors and accepted by recipients with no or
little objection because of their extreme vulnerability or lack of bargaining authority
(Barakat & Chard, 2002). Security is of vital importance to the effective recovery and
reconstruction of a war-torn state. There has to be an understanding between the
international community and the state representatives incharge of this process to yield
better outcomes. No objective can be achieved with a lack of planning and coordination
among all the relevant stakeholders. However, with a lack of capacity within the state
institutions, measures should be taken to develop their capacity and handover more
responsibility to them. It would be desirable to know when the whole process of
reconstruction and development is Afghan led after 2014, what current problems would
continue to exist and what new challenges would emerge to impede the process of
sustainable reconstruction and development.

3.2

Research Bias

Utmost care was taken by the author to remain unbiased in this research. However
taking into account the nature and mentality of the humans, it may be possible that
unintentionally and subconsciously some of the materials and findings in this research
may have been biased. A reason for this could have been the author’s link to Afghanistan.
Further, the participants interviewed for this study were all present in Afghanistan. These
participants were serving either the state institutions or the international organizations
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involved in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Thus, there is a
possibility that the responses of these participants to the interview questions may have
been biased to one end or the other.

3.3

Methodology

“The “holy grail” of research is establishing methodological rigor. This refers to a
researcher's responsibility to ensure that procedures have been adhered to and
confounding factors eliminated to produce dependable results” (Hasson & Keeney,
2011). This study has been carried out using two approaches - the Delphi technique and
the use of case studies. These methods were used to bring to light some of factors
affecting the process of sustainable reconstruction and development in Afghanistan in the
post 2014 period.

3.3.1

The Delphi Technique

The Delphi Technique is a qualitative method that “elicits, refines, and draws
upon the collective opinion and expertise of a group of experts for long-range
forecasting” (Gupta & Clarke, 1996). More generally, the technique is seen as a
procedure to “obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of experts…by a
series of intensive questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback” (Dalkey
& Helmer, 1963). It is typically used to “elicit information, suggestions, and judgments
from a dispersed and heterogeneous group of specialists on an issue of interest to all of
them, but where there may not yet be a clear agreement on the shape of the issue”
(Lambert, Nolan, Peterson, & Pierce, 2007). The intent of Delphi is not to challenge
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statistical or model-based procedures, it is to judge and forecast situations in which pure
model-based statistical methods are not practical or possible because of the lack of data –
historical, economic, technical – and thus some form of human judgmental input is
necessary (Rowe & Wright, 1999). As such, the goal of Delphi is ‘simply to obtain as
many high-quality responses and opinions as possible on a given issue from a group of
experts to enhance decision making’ (Gupta & Clarke, 1996).
The Delphi Technique is named after the Greek oracle at Delphi, who offered
visions of the future to those who sought advice (Gupta & Clarke, 1996). This technique
was developed in the 1950s by – Gordon, Helmer, and Dalkey – workers at the RAND
corporation while working on a project funded by the US Air Force (Rowe & Wright,
1999). The method became popular and aroused worldwide interest after an article
describing this research was published in 1963 (Woudenberg, 1991).
The Delphi Technique has many applications and “works well when the factors
surrounding the problem are not well understood, controversial or subjectively weighted.
It is particularly useful in generating a model for future data-gathering” (Lambert et al.,
2007). Some uses of this technique are to:
1. Establish goals and their priorities.
2. Identify the dimensions and attributes of a problem.
3. Provide predictions.
4. Clarify positions and delineate differences between group members.
5. Gather information from a group whose members wish to retain their
anonymity (Delp, Thesen, Motiwalla, & Seshadri, 1977)
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A key reason for the continuous popularity of Delphi is its unique strengths. It is a
structured, yet indirect, approach to quickly and efficiently elicit responses from experts
who bring knowledge, authority, and insight to the problem (Gupta & Clarke, 1996).
Gupta & Clarke (1996) describes some of the advantages of this technique as below:
1. This method captures a wide range of interrelated variables and
multidimensional features common to most complex problems.
2. It has a fair to good prediction accuracy over different time horizons.
3. It documents facts and opinions of the experts.
4. It avoids pitfalls of face-to-face interaction, such as group conflict and
individual dominance.
5. It is a good method to deal with the open-ended and creative aspects of a
problem because it motivates independent thought and gradual formation of
solutions.
6. It is a relatively inexpensive method to organize and administer.
However, this technique has also some limitations, which include “potential for
sloppy execution, crudely designed questions, poor choice of experts, and limited value
of feedback” (Gupta & Clarke, 1996).

3.3.2

General Delphi Procedure

The Delphi technique is iterative. It is executed in ‘rounds’. A set of initial
questions framed around an issue is sent to a list of preselected experts via email, fax,
mail or web. Respondents are asked to provide written feedback on the problem. The
results of the first round are analyzed and used to help structure more detailed questions

66
for the second round. The responses from the second round can be used to help structure
a third round, if necessary (Lambert et al., 2007). Generally, two to three rounds are
carried out but may vary depending on the issue being studied and the type of Delphi
design (Hasson & Keeney, 2011). There is no guarantee that the Delphi technique will
result in a consensus among participants concerning the issue being studied, however it
does succeed in generating a framework of the main problems (Lambert et al., 2007).

3.3.3

Sampling Design

One of the marks of a qualitative study is the use of purposeful sampling (Patton,
2002). This sampling design confines specific types of people who can provide the
desired information, either because they are the only ones who have it, or conform to
some criteria set by the researcher (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). This study utilizes this
method to identify the participants for this research. The criteria set for this reason by the
author are:
1. Participants have to have an understanding of the issues surrounding the
research topic. This was verified by two conditions. First, the requirement was
for the participants to have at least a bachelor’s degree in their respective
fields. Second, they were to have at least two years of work experience in the
post-2001 Afghanistan.
2. They have to be middle to high ranking officials – for instance department
heads, directors, presidents, CEOs, advisors, program officers/managers or the
deputies of these positions – within the state institutions, international
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organizations and private firms involved with the reconstruction and
development activities of Afghanistan.

Creswell (2003) mentions that the sample size for a study varies by the type of
study – approximately 15 for experiment, 30 for a correlational study that relates
variables, and 350 for a survey study. However, for the Delphi technique the sample size
could range from 5 to 30 (Rowe & Wright, 1999). Linstone & Turoff have stated that in
the original RAND effort a Delphi was sent to 5 to 15 experts asked to rank in order the
critical top ten targets and explain why each was so important (Linstone & Turoff, 2011).
The number of participants to be included for this study was set to be 10. This is a decent
number considering the position and status of the participants chosen for this study.

3.3.4

Participation Rate

In order to collect the required data, a total of forty-six individuals meeting the
above set criteria for this study were identified. These individuals were informed of this
study and asked for their kind participation. However, out of this group of forty-six only
nine individuals participated in the first round. Thus, the response rate of the participants
for this round was about 19 percent. For the second round, a total of eight individuals
participated out of the group of nine from the first round. Though, the numbers of
participants in both cases were below the set number of 10 for this study, however it was
higher than the minimum number of five participants required for using the Delphi
technique.

68
3.3.5

Case Studies

A case study research is the study of a real-life case within a specific setting (Yin,
2009). Some researchers (Stake, 1995) argue that ‘case study research is not a
methodology but a choice of what is to be studied’, however other researchers argue that
it is a ‘strategy of inquiry, a methodology, or a complete research strategy’ (Creswell,
2013; Yin, 2009). Thus, it could be contended that a ‘case study research is a qualitative
approach where a researcher explores a real-life object of study in depth’ (Creswell,
2013).
The types of cases selected for this study are what Stake (1995) call as
instrumental cases. These cases serve to understand a specific problem or an issue within
a given context. Further, the type of case study adopted for this research is the collective
case study, where multiple cases are selected to study the issue/s under concern from
different perspectives (Creswell, 2013). The numbers of cases studied for this research
are six. There is no definitive answer on the number of case studies to be selected for a
research, however Creswell (2013) states that ‘researchers generally choose no more than
four or five cases’. The criteria of case selection for this study are as follows:
1. The cases should be reconstruction and development projects implemented
in Afghanistan between the periods 2002 to 2013.
2. These projects should have been implemented by one of the actors
involved in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, for
instance, Ministry of Urban Development, Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development, the World Bank, the United States
Agency for International Development, and so forth.
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3. These cases should be representatives of different regions of Afghanistan,
i.e. East, West, North, and South.
4. These cases should have been implemented under varying ground
conditions, i.e. secure areas and insecure areas.

3.4

Study Environment

This study was carried out at the Purdue University of West Lafayette, Indiana.
Purdue University is one of the top research universities both in the United States and the
World. The research conducted in this study, which is extensively qualitative, was done
at the West Lafayette campus. The reason for this was that the researcher was a full time
student in the department of Building Construction Management and the resources
required to carry out this research was easily available in this institution.
The interviews with the subjects were carried out via email due to certain travel
limitations. These subjects who were experts in their fields were contacted through email
and interviewed in the same manner for this research.

3.5

Approvals

A meeting was held with the Internal Review Board (IRB) of Purdue University.
The IRB was informed of the research and its methodology and the relevant approval was
sought. After reviewing the documentation about the research, permission was granted to
carry out the interviews.
The subjects of the interview were informed about this study. The importance of
their participation and feedback was mentioned. The subjects were provided full
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confidentiality about their identity and whatsoever within and outside this study. After
receiving their consent interviews were conducted.

3.6

Data Collection

Data collection could be considered a series of interrelated activities aimed at
gathering good information to answer research questions (Creswell, 2013). The initial
data for this study was collected from journal articles and books. The majority of these
journal articles and books were readily available in the physical and online library of
Purdue University. Further, websites of credible international organizations involved with
the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, for instance USAID, World Bank,
UN, etc., were also explored for available data and resources.
Field data for this research was collected by questioning experts in the field.
These ‘experts’ were individuals who had met the qualification and experience
requirements set for this study. Identification of and access to these experts within the
aforementioned organizations was challenging. The author, for this reason, approached
his contacts in Afghanistan who identified and contacted these experts. These contacts
were active middle to high ranking officials – directors, presidents, CEOs – within the
government and international organizations. When communication was established with
the experts, the questions round was commenced.
This process of sending a set of questions and receiving the feedback from the
respondents was carried out via email for two reasons. First, as mentioned in the
limitations section of this study, the researcher could not travel to Afghanistan for certain
reasons. Second, due to the time constraints and availability of the participants, it was
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convenient to them to respond to the questions with no specific deadlines. As mentioned
earlier in this section, such flexibility would ensure that the participants have thoroughly
answered all the questions to the full extent of their knowledge. Further, utilizing a fax to
serve this purpose would have yielded no result as there is limited fax service available in
Afghanistan. Similarly, using postal services would have been impractical due to time
constraint and the distance between the two countries.
Once the ‘experts in the field’ were identified and initial communication
established, a set of questions consistent with the statement of objectives were
formulated. The questions for the first iteration of Delphi were:

1. What do you think are the obstacles in the process of reconstruction and
development post-2014 within your organization?
2. What do you think are the obstacles in the process of reconstruction and
development post-2014 in other national or international organizations
involved in this process?
3. What improvement opportunities do you see for the obstacles you have
mentioned in question 1 and 2?

The questions framed were open-ended. This choice was made to ensure a better
coverage of the different aspects of this subject, which might or might not have been
discussed in the literature review. These questions along with a short cover letter
outlining the task and reiterating the understanding reached in the early communications
were sent to the participants. The same process for the second round of questions was
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repeated entailing more detailed questions based on the responses received from the
participants in round one. A list of these questions can be found in the appendix.
The case studies were identified by searching the project databases of
organizations active in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The projects
accessible on these databases were available for the general public. The projects selected
were by reading the executive summaries of the available projects on the databases of
these organizations and matching it with the criteria set forth for this study.

3.7

Analysis

Data analysis in a qualitative research consists of preparing and organizing the
data for analysis, then reducing the data into themes and finally representing the data in
figures, tables or discussion. This is the general process however there will be variations
in this approach depending on the type of study and the methodology used (Creswell,
2013).
Following the end of the first round of Delphi and upon receiving the feedback
from the participants, the responses were analyzed and sorted based on distinct
information contained within each document. All the responses from each participant
were read meticulously and reflected upon to identify the different issues and their central
themes in terms of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. Each of the responses
was put in a group, stacked separately and labeled with the central theme, commonalities
and differences. Categories of different issues were created based on the information
provided by the participants. These categories of common and varying issues were
transformed into a matrix in Microsoft Excel. By categorizing the different issues and
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arranging them in a matrix, attempt was made to get a holistic view of all the issues
surrounding the topic of research.
The questions for round two were structured with refined parameters based on the
information provided by the participants in round one. These questions were much more
detailed compared to the questions of the first round. Similar to round one, these
questions along with a cover letter were sent to the participants for their feedback. The
responses from the second round were again thoroughly analyzed, sorted and categorized
based on their differences and commonalities. The issues identified from the responses of
the second round were incorporated into the matrix created earlier for the first round.
Based on this matrix, the issues mentioned by the participants were categorized into
several identifiable overarching issues. A list of these major issues affecting the
reconstruction and development process of Afghanistan was created.
To validate these issues externally, the findings of the case studies were used to
support them. The case studies were analyzed using what Yin (2009) calls embedded
analysis. This type of analysis looks at the specific aspects of the cases and focuses on
the key issues present. First, a general description of all these cases and the noted issues
was presented. This was followed by the analysis of the factors identified both through
the Delphi technique and the case study research. These factors were analyzed through
cross-case analysis, where all these factors were discussed within the light of each case
study separately. A general theme of the data collection and analysis process is presented
in figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. Data Collection and Analysis Process
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3.8

Chapter Summary

This chapter provided an outline of the overall framework and methodology used
in this research. This chapter discussed the theoretical framework, research bias, the
research methodology, the study environment, and the data collection and analysis
methods employed in this study.
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CHAPTER 4. DATA AND ANALYSIS

“Lucky is he who has been able to understand the causes of things”
Virgil 70-19 BC: Georgics

4.1

The Reality

Reconstruction and development, specifically in a post-conflict setting, is of
utmost importance and are determinants of the prosperous or bleak future of a state. Out
of the 7 billion plus population of this world, about 20% lives in the rich (high-income)
countries and the rest in the developing countries. Among these developing countries,
where the other 80% of the world population live, some are prospering and on track to
entering the group of the rich countries, that is, its population will have access to better
education and health care, employment opportunities, better living environment and so
forth. However, over a billion of the people in these countries (low-income) live in
conditions that are of the fourteenth century – conflicts, plague, ignorance – and most of
these countries are situated in Africa and Central Asia (Collier, 2007). Why does
development matter in these low-income countries and why should the rest of the world
care about it? It is because the thriving middle-income and high-income countries are
increasingly vulnerable to these countries in this age of globalization. It is not only that
these countries have poor economy and slow growth but the living conditions are much
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worse than the rest of the world. For example, the average life expectancy in these
countries is fifty years, whereas in the other developing countries it is sixty-seven years.
Infant mortality – the proportion of children who die before their fifth birthday – is 14
percent in these countries, whereas in the other developing countries it is 4 percent. The
proportion of children with symptoms of long-term malnutrition is 36 percent in these
countries compared to 20 percent for the other developing countries. The average income
of a person in these countries is only one-fifth of what it is in other developing countries
(Collier, 2007).
So low income and slow growth in these countries not only make living
conditions worse but also spreads poverty and hopelessness, especially among the youth.
This provides opportunities to the youth to create gangs, increasing the crime rate, and
groups to rebel against the government. This gives rise to conflicts which in most cases
end up in civil wars lasting for years and in some cases decades. Conflicts affect the
region directly and the world indirectly in two ways. First, it not just results in the death
of people due to the use of weapons but also through diseases. Conflicts create refugees
and mass movements of these refugees in the absence of public health systems create
epidemics. Refugees in their trek across areas and countries pick up diseases with little
resistance and carry it to their place of refuge infecting the people already living there.
Diseases are highly persistent and they do not stop once the fighting stops.
Further, diseases are not limited to a certain country or region. For example, combination
of mass rape and mass migration in wars produce ideal conditions to spread sexually
transmitted diseases, which has been the case for HIV. Another recent example is the
spread of ‘polio virus’, which has been declared as an international public health
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emergency by the World Health Organization (WHO). According to BBC News (2014),
Pakistan, Cameroon, and Syria pose the greatest risk of further exportation of this virus in
2014. All three of these countries have low-income and slow growth and have recently
been or are still in a conflict. Attacks on the vaccine campaigns in the tribal areas of
Pakistan have allowed the virus to spread across borders. Syria, which was polio-free for
14 years, was re-infected with the virus from Pakistan, as a result of Pakistani insurgents
fighting in Syria. Refugees from Syria are pouring out to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey,
and checking all of them for this virus will be impossible. This brings us to our second
point and that is the creation of a territory that is outside the control of a recognized
government.
Conflicts end up in generating territories over which the government of a country
cannot have full control. As a result these territories end up as safe havens for terrorist
groups and drug traffickers. Ninety-five percent of the world’s drugs are produced in the
conflict countries. Further, the activities of these terrorist groups are not limited to the
region they are based in but are also global – for example, the incidents of 9/11, the
London bombing, and so forth. Conflicts may incur varying costs to the country and the
region depending on its magnitude, however, a typical civil war would cost $64 billion to
the country and its neighbors (Collier, 2007). Conflicts not only affect the economy of a
country but the region in general, and the economy of a region can affect the economy of
the world itself. So, it is not that development in these low-income countries is just a
local or regional problem but it is a global one that needs to be fixed.
As has been noted in the literature review part of this study, there are many
factors that contribute to the success or failure of reconstruction and development
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projects and programs. It is vital to identify these factors in order to ensure an efficient
and productive development process. Identification of these factors for this study was
carried out through interviews and analysis of case studies of projects implemented in
Afghanistan. The following section discusses the interviews that were conducted for this
study, followed by case studies and the relevant discussions.

4.2

The Interviewees

As a result of the confidentiality agreement between the author and the
participants, no information about the individuals who have participated in this study will
be disclosed. However, to establish data validity and reliability and to outline the range of
the data collected; brief profile of the organizations where the participating interviewees
are currently engaged is provided below:
1. Ministry Of Finance (Government of Afghanistan)
“The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is responsible for the management and execution
of the budget, collection of taxes, organization and control of public expenditure and
payments to the government. The Ministry of Finance, as the responsible body for public
finance and expenditure, has increased its efforts on coordination and management of
international financial assistance to Afghanistan and in convincing donors to channel
more funds through the government treasury for the reconstruction and development of
Afghanistan.” (Ministry of Finance, 2014).
2. Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD)
Formerly known as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),
DFATD has the mandate to “manage Canada's diplomatic and consular relations, to
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encourage the country's international trade and to lead Canada’s international
development and humanitarian assistance” (DFATD, 2014a). Canada has spent hundreds
of millions of dollars in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan post-2001.
The DFATD’s work focused on “supporting basic services, infrastructure, rural
development, community development councils, humanitarian assistance, democratic
governance, investing in the future of children & youth, security, the rule of law, and
human rights” (DFATD, 2014b).
3. United States Department of Commerce (USDC)
“The Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force (Task Force) of the
U.S. Department of Commerce facilitates and coordinates the Department’s activities that
are designed to help Afghanistan develop a sustainable economy. Its efforts focus on
helping Afghanistan develop a commercial legal environment that supports trade,
investment and private sector-led growth, a more capable and competitive private sector,
and stronger U.S.-Afghan commercial ties” (USDC, 2014).
4. United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
“UNOPS has supported the Government of Afghanistan in collaboration with
donor governments, UN organizations and other partners. By providing sustainable
infrastructure, procurement and project management services, UNOPS support the
Government with its national reconstruction and development efforts, focusing on the
promotion of national ownership and capacity development. In Afghanistan, UNOPS has
constructed and rehabilitated over 10,000 kilometers of road, rehabilitated airports and
hospitals, and designed and constructed schools for higher education” (UNOPS, 2014).
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5. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
The cross-cutting themes that are the areas of focus of UNFPA in Afghanistan are
Reproductive Health, Gender Based Violence, and Population & Development. The
UNFPA has supported many projects in the aforementioned areas in Afghanistan in
partnership with the Afghan Government and various Non-Governmental Organizations
(UNFPA, 2014).
6. International Home Finance and Development (IHFD)
IHFD is a limited liability construction company based in Denver, Colorado,
USA. IHFD's main areas of operation in Afghanistan have been:
a. “Design, partial manufacturing, installation as well as operation and maintenance of
renewable energy systems such as solar power, wind power and hydro power.
b. Design, installation and operation of environmental technologies such as wastewater
treatment systems, solid waste management systems and heating and cooling systems.
c. Production and marketing of alternative, "Green" construction technologies.
d. Housing development and finance.
e. Construction management and finance” (IHFD, 2014).
7. Appleton Consulting
“Appleton Consulting Inc. (ACI) is an international business consulting company
based in Afghanistan that focuses on enabling unique business solutions for emerging and
developing market sectors. ACI provides a wide range of services for its Afghan and
international clients including business management, strategic partnership development,
and supply chain management. ACI has worked with over 70 Afghan companies, the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Office
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for Project Services (UNOPS), the Government of Afghanistan, the Canadian Embassy in
Kabul, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Aga Khan Foundation, U.S
coalition forces, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Afghanistan International Bank (AIB)” (Appleton
Consulting, 2014).
8. Think Renewables
“Think Renewables, Inc. (TRI) is a United States based company that develops
technologies to help solve current problems and promote sustainable development with
Afghanistan as one of its areas of operations. All the profits of TRI are donated to Charity
Help International to support its humanitarian work in the country where it is selling its
products” (Think Renewables, 2014).
9. Abdulhai Gardezi Construction Firm (ACF)
ACF is a local Afghan construction firm that has operated in the country since
2006. ACF has implemented a number of infrastructure and vertical projects for different
donors in Afghanistan including United States Army Corps of Engineers (ACF, 2014).

4.3

Analysis of the Interview Data

After receiving the feedback of the participants for both rounds of the interviews,
analysis of these responses was commenced. Each response was carefully and critically
reviewed and the terms and phrases describing a particular issue by the participant were
noted down in a table. This process was carried for all the responses of the participants of
this study. The table highlighting the terms and phrases used by the participants to
describe the various issues is presented in Appendix C.
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After completion of this initial phase of data analysis, the produced table of the
specific terms and phrases was analyzed. A certain commonality of issues could be
observed in these terms and phrases. Therefore, all the issues in this table were
categorized into their respective overarching issues. This categorization of the various
issues can be observed in the table present in Appendix D. A summary of the overarching
issues identified through analysis of the collected data from these interviews is presented
in table 4.1 below. Further, the number of participants having mentioned a certain issue
in their responses can also be observed in this table.

OVERARCHING ISSUES

Table 4.1. Issues Identified through Analysis of the Interview Data
NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

ISSUES
Security Challenge
Qualified Human Capital
Government Capacity
Investment Risk
Corruption
Development Budget Reduction
Economic Growth
Policy Reforms
Transparency & Accountability
Government-Donor Coordination
Turnover

4.4

MODE
8
8
7
7
7
6
5
5
4
3
1

Case Studies

The case studies analyzed for this study were all implemented in Afghanistan by
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and were accessed
through its projects database known as Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC).
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Each case was analyzed individually and the existing issues were noted down. A brief
summary of these cases and the associated issues are presented in the following tables.

Table 4.2. Case Study 1 - Kabul to Kandahar Highway
(Source: USAID, Audit of the Kabul to Kandahar Highway Reconstruction Activities
Financed by USAID/Afghanistan’s Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services
Program, 2004)
CASE STUDY 1
PROJECT

Kabul to Kandahar Highway
Implemented under the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities

OBJECTIVE

and Services (REFS) program, the aim of the project was to
promote economic recovery and political stability by repairing
infrastructure in Afghanistan.

LOCATION

East to Southwest of Afghanistan – passing through Kabul,
Kandahar, Wardak, Ghazni, and Zabul provinces

ESTIMATED COST

$269 million

ORIGINAL

September 2002 to December 2004 (project was completed at

DURATION

the end of 2005)
The project, awarded to Louis Berger Group, Inc. (LBGI) by
USAID, consisted of removing the old road surface, survey,

PROJECT SCOPE

design, and reconstruction of a segment (389 kilometers) of
the Kabul-Kandahar Highway along with bridges (6),
causeways, and culverts.

MAJOR ISSUES

•

Security

•

Personnel

•

Personnel Competence

•

Project Design

•

Project Management
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Table 4.3. Case Study 2 - Kandahar to Herat Highway
(Source: USAID, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Reconstruction of the Kandahar-Herat
Highway under the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services Program, 2006)
CASE STUDY 2
PROJECT

Kandahar to Herat Highway
Implemented under the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities

OBJECTIVE

and Services (REFS) program, the aim of the project was to
promote economic recovery and political stability by repairing
infrastructure in Afghanistan.

LOCATION

South to Northwest of Afghanistan – passing through
Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, and Herat provinces

ESTIMATED COST

$257 million

ORIGINAL

September 2002 to December 2005 (project was completed in

DURATION

mid-2007)
This USAID project, also awarded to Louis Berger Group, Inc.
(LBGI), like the Kabul-Kandahar Highway consisted of the
following activities:

PROJECT SCOPE

•

Demining the highway right-of-way

•

Removing the old road surface

•

Surveying and designing the highway

•

Mobilizing camp sites and asphalt making plants

•

Constructing the new highway (326 kilometers), including
culverts, causeways, and bridges (4).

MAJOR ISSUES

•

Security

•

Project Management

•

Funding

•

Personnel Competence

•

Personnel Turnover
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Table 4.4. Case Study 3 - Strategic Provincial Roads
(Source: USAID, Final Report Evaluation of USAID’s Strategic Provincial Roads
Southern and Eastern SPR-SEA Program, 2011)
CASE STUDY 3
PROJECT

Strategic Provincial Roads – Southern & Eastern Afghanistan
The Strategic Provincial Roads (SPR) was part of the
reconstruction program of Afghanistan aimed at increasing

OBJECTIVE

stability and security in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan by
rehabilitating provincial roads and improving subcontractor
capacity to build and maintain roads.

LOCATION

Eastern and Southern Afghanistan

ESTIMATED COST

$269.5 million

DURATION

2007 to 2011 (terminated)
The SPR project, awarded to International Relief and
Development, Inc. (IRD) by USAID, was expected to
rehabilitate an estimated 1500 to 2000 kilometers of roads to

PROJECT SCOPE

an all-weather gravel standard. In addition, capacity building
and community development were designed to facilitate
construction and minimize community impact caused by road
construction and ensure sustainability of the rehabilitated
roads.

MAJOR ISSUES

•

Security

•

Project Management

•

Personnel Turnover

•

Personnel Competence

•

Project Design

•

Communication between Project Staff

•

Subcontractors
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Table 4.5. Case Study 4 - Alternative Development Program for Eastern Afghanistan
(Source: USAID, Evaluation Report of Alternative Development Program (ADP) Eastern
Region by USAID in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010a)
CASE STUDY 4
PROJECT

Alternative Development Program (ADP) – Eastern
Afghanistan
The goal of this project was to accelerate the regional
economic development in ways that provide new opportunities

OBJECTIVE

to the population to seek livelihoods in the licit economy, and
soften the socio-economic shockwaves of the reduction in
opium economy.

LOCATION

Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and Nuristan provinces

ESTIMATED COST

$118.4 million

DURATION

February 2005 to June 2009
Awarded to Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) by USAID,
this project consisted of:

PROJECT SCOPE

MAJOR ISSUES

•

Improving rural roads to connect farms to the markets

•

Renewal of irrigation infrastructure

•

Improvement of agricultural production

•

Rehabilitation of potential irrigable land

•

Assisting small to medium enterprises with business skills

•

Personnel Competence

•

Project Design
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Table 4.6. Case Study 5 - Alternative Development Program for Northern Afghanistan
(Source: USAID, Evaluation Report of Alternative Development Program (ADP)
Northern Region by USAID in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010b)
CASE STUDY 5
PROJECT

Alternative Development Program (ADP) – Northern
Afghanistan
The goal of this project was to accelerate the regional
economic development in ways that provide new opportunities

OBJECTIVE

to the population to seek livelihoods in the licit economy, and
soften the socio-economic shockwaves of the reduction in
opium economy.

LOCATION

Badakhshan and Takhar provinces

ESTIMATED COST

$60 million

DURATION

2005 to 2009
The project was awarded to PADCO by USAID and consisted
of the following activities:
•

PROJECT SCOPE

Infrastructure construction/rehabilitation (roads, bridges,
canals)

•

Construction of structures (veterinary clinics, root cellars)

•

Improvements in agricultural productions

•

Agribusiness development (feedlot, walnut processing,
potato seed production, marketing)

MAJOR ISSUES

•

Project Management

•

Project Design

•

Personnel Competence

•

Personnel

•

Corruption

•

Communication and Coordination with Govt. Agencies
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Table 4.7. Case Study 6 - Alternative Development Program for Southern Afghanistan
(Source: USAID, Evaluation Report of Alternative Development Program (ADP)
Southern Region by USAID in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010c)
CASE STUDY 6
PROJECT

Alternative Development Program (ADP) – Southern
Afghanistan
The goal of this project was to accelerate the regional
economic development in ways that provide new opportunities

OBJECTIVE

to the population to seek livelihoods in the licit economy, and
soften the socio-economic shockwaves of the reduction in
opium economy.

LOCATION

Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan provinces

ESTIMATED COST

$162 million

DURATION

2005 to 2009
The activities for this USAID project, awarded to
Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), consisted of:
•

Construction/rehabilitation of infrastructure projects
(Lashkar Gah airport runway, electrical substation, roads,

PROJECT SCOPE

irrigation canals)
•

Improvements in agricultural productions

•

Agribusiness development (poultry, livestock feed mills,
marketing)

MAJOR ISSUES

•

Security

•

Personnel Competence

•

Project Design

•

Personnel Turnover

•

Communication and Coordination with Govt. Agencies

•

Corruption
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4.5

Identified Factors

Based on the analysis of the data from the interviews and the case studies, the
following factors have been found to impact reconstruction and development activities in
Afghanistan. The rationale behind the selection of these factors is the shared
commonality of these factors among the list of the issues identified through the use of the
two research methods applied in this study.
1. Security
2. Mismanagement
3. Personnel Competence
4. Personnel Turnover
5. Corruption
6. Accountability
7. Government-Donor Coordination

4.6

Analysis of the Identified Factors

1. Security
Security has been a major obstacle in implementing projects affecting them not
only in terms of completion on time but also quality and cost. It resulted in limited
number of site visits for the first case study. The site visits that were made for this project
were either under very tight security or from air using helicopters. The outcome of this
was increased project cost and poor quality control. Efforts were made to increase
monitoring personnel for this project from 2 to 10; however the security situation
continued to effect the recruitment. Although, financial incentives were offered and the
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work and living conditions were improved, however this only resulted in filling only one
additional position (USAID, 2004). Similarly, in the second case study, which was
initially considered to be in a rather secure area than the first case study, deteriorating
security conditions resulted in staff turnover affecting the quality and timely completion
of the project. Further, the security situation increased the security cost of the project
resulting in an increase in the overall cost of the project itself. The first case study and the
second case study projects were both implemented under the Rehabilitation of Economic
Facilities and Services (REFS) program, which was initially estimated to cost $155
million, however security being one of the reasons, increased this initial cost to $730
million. In addition, both of the projects were scheduled to be completed by the end of
2004 and 2005 respectively; however the first case study project was completed at the
end of 2005 and the second case study project in mid-2007 (USAID, 2006).
South-east and southern parts of Afghanistan are relatively more insecure than the
rest of the country. The third case study project suffered immensely from the insecurity in
these areas. Although, security issues were addressed in the proposal through community
outreach programs, however this approach yielded positive results in only certain areas.
Overall, this project suffered from 928 security incidents – deadly military attacks, roadside bombs, and kidnappings – which resulted in 127 deaths and 258 injuries between
2007 and 2011. These attacks were sporadic and differed between provinces, however the
highest number of incidents were in two provinces – Paktika (122) and Helmand (117) –
and the lowest number of incidents were in Nangarhar and Laghman. Speculations point
to the varying levels of community support for this difference in these provinces,
however Nangarhar and Laghman were initially relatively stable provinces compared to
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the others. These security incidents resulted in a proportionate increase in the security
costs of the subcontractors. In some cases, the subcontractors could not mobilize their
equipment and personnel to the job site. This resulted in no progress payments affecting
the subcontractors’ cash-flow, which in turn caused the termination of the contract by
convenience or default. In addition, parts of the project that could be worked on could not
be visited by the senior managers, resulting in poor quality control and delayed decision
making delaying the project completion itself (USAID, 2011).
Similarly, in the sixth case study, the substation upgrade in Lashkar Gah,
Helmand province, which included addition of distribution lines and transformers, could
not be completed because of rocket attacks. The security situation resulted in poor project
oversight as personnel were confined to their compounds. Furthermore, some activities of
this project were forced to shut earlier in the Kandahar region due to increased insurgent
attacks (USAID, 2010c). In summary, the security situation resulted in increased project
costs, project delays, and project termination affecting the reconstruction and
development program in many areas. However, case studies four and five did not suffer
from security incidents, compared to case study six, as they were situated in relatively
stable areas. Yet case study four was considered a success whereas case study five was
considered a failure. Thus, the security situation is not the only factor leading to success
or failure of a project, which is discussed in the following sections.

2. Mismanagement
Mismanagement has been observed to be consistent in many projects in both
secure and insecure areas. The primary problems have been project monitoring and
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quality control. The Louis Berger Group (LBGI) and USAID, for instance, did not fully
monitor the first case study project activities, project timeline, or the quality of the work.
The performance of the contractor was not fully monitored to ensure that the approved
quality control and assurance programs were strictly followed. Further, the quality testing
laboratory of the contractor was not inspected and thus the testing done was not in
compliance with standards. LBGI had not properly trained its personnel for this project.
For example, when cracks were noted in the asphalt layer due to paving during bad
weather or cold asphalt during compaction, the contractor was not asked to stop work or
remove the layer. This lack of adherence to project quality control and assurance
requirements resulted in 30 kilometers of asphalt to be removed due to quality issues,
pushing back the project completion date. As mentioned in the security part above,
efforts were made to increase monitoring personnel for this project from 2 to 10, however
only 3 positions could be filled due to the security and working conditions. However, the
roles of these available monitoring personnel were poorly defined and/or had other duties
in addition to monitoring this project (USAID, 2004). This points to the fact that this
project was not managed well by LBGI, despite all the challenges that were known and
present on the ground.
There were no quality issues reported for the second case study as in contrast to
the first case study. This could be related to the location of this project being in a
relatively secure area compared to the project in the first case study and the willingness
of personnel to work in this area. Yet, this project was completed in mid-2007, more than
a year after the original project end date. The reason for this delay was an increase in the
project cost and a lack of funding as a result. The cost increase was because of a lack of
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assessment of the old road and bridges due to demining issues (USAID, 2006). This
alludes that certain challenges were not taken into consideration when this project was
planned and appropriated.
On the contrary, the third case study proposal was well prepared. The proposal
took into consideration the security issues in remote areas and addressed this issue
through community outreach program. The low skill level labor and subcontractor issues
were addressed through capacity building and training. Similarly, other variables such as
field conditions, labor pool, ethnic and political factors were also taken into account. The
security personnel and labors for this project were to be hired from the local
communities. This was thought to improve the local economy and increase the local
community support for the project reducing any security risks. The unskilled labors were
to be provided hands on mentoring in the field and the subcontractors were to be trained
in project management in Kabul. All these variables increased the complexity of the
project and required a well-organized and efficient plan to render it practical. However,
the one issue in this regard was the system of authority delegation to the field for
decision-making and implementation (USAID, 2011).
Although, International Relief and Development (IRD) had prior experience in
Afghanistan and had taken key factors into account but the problematic issue was the
organizational structure. The Chief of Party (COP), located in Kabul, was the main
decision-maker, making the decision-making process centralized. The poor management
structure could not address the realities in the field. It slowed down the information flow
and decision-making resulting in delays in resolving field problems. For instance, the
road design requirements in the contract were more excessive for the low traffic volumes
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of these provincial roads. The design criteria used for the SPR roads was the same as for
the first and second case studies. However, rectification of this problem on time failed
because of the centralized organizational structure and slow flow of communication
between the field staff and senior managers. As mentioned in the security factor, senior
managers could not visit the field due to the security situation. This further emphasized
for the need to decentralize mid-level management decision making. As critical decisions
were passed up the chain of command, this overwhelmed the senior area managers with
day to day issues. This preoccupation with the details of daily management obscured their
broader view and direction of the program. However, if the field offices were staffed with
expat managers, many problems could have been prevented. The general feeling in the
field was a lack of support from the management in Kabul, resulting in a breakdown of
confidence between the field staff and the senior managers (USAID, 2011).
The third case study was conceived with the notion that violence was decreasing.
This particular notion was perhaps the reason that no significant risk analysis or
contingency planning was carried out for this project. As mentioned earlier, security
attacks increased heavily in 2009, especially in the Helmand and Paktika provinces. The
security issue, as mentioned above, was to be addressed through the community outreach
program. However, the community mobilization teams focused more on the Community
Development Councils (CDC) and formal political structures than on ‘Shuras’ (local
community councils). This was perhaps due to poor understanding of the traditional rural
social and political structures. The result was a lack of preparation for the community
groundwork before the arrival of road program teams. This may have been one of the
factors for increased security problems in certain areas. In highly insecure areas, IRD
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could have suspended the project and transferred all equipment and operations to an
alternative project. This could have motivated the community to help deal with the
security issues, knowing that because of the insecurity they will not have roads. However,
because of a lack of functional decision-making process, which resulted in a series of
poor decisions, the third case study was eventually terminated in 2011 (USAID, 2011).
Similar to the first and second case studies, the third case study had also quality
control issues. The quality control laboratories were in many cases not up to standards.
Often times, the test results despite not being up to standards were recorded as being in
compliance. This problem was recognized by USAID and in 2010 hired TetraTech to
establish third party QA process. However, the benefit of this action was infinitesimal as
the project was terminated in 2011 (USAID, 2011).
The fifth case study also suffered from mismanagement. The program operations
began in November 2005, whereas the winter limited operational activities until May
2006. The project design, approval, and implementation did not confirm with the climate
realities of northern Afghanistan. This project had both infrastructure and agricultural
activities. However, the results of these activities were found unsatisfying. In
infrastructure, the bridges seemed well constructed but the roads were of poor quality,
specifically because of asphalting problems during unfavorable weather. A canal, the
Baharak Power canal, was constructed in unstable soil on a steep slope. The construction
material did not meet the project specification requirements (cement to sand ration of 1:7
compared to 1:4 required). Further, large boulders and breaches were observed in the
canal after completion. Its walls collapsed after seasonal floods and seepage eroded
unlined canal banks. This canal which was supposed to deliver water to the downstream
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power plant and irrigation fields, failed to do so. Further, it threatened a road that was just
close by to this canal. In addition, root cellars constructed for the farmers to store
potatoes and food in general were a failure as they were conducive to fungus. The
evaluation team of this project expressed serious reservations about the metrics used to
guide and measure progress and success (USAID, 2010b).
In agricultural activities, vegetable seeds and fertilizers were distributed.
However, some crops were serious economic disappointment as local field testing was
not carried out. Farmers in Badakhshan started suffering losses in potato crops as a result
of Colorado Beetle, which they blamed PADCO for introducing to their environment.
Further, fruit saplings were distributed to the farmers, however no training in terms of
orchard management was provided to them (USAID, 2010b).
PADCO developed a negative image not just because of the failure of the
aforementioned activities, but also because of its heavy security footprint and the relative
high cost. The high security profile and extravagant lifestyle of PADCO was found
intimidating by the locals, as Badakhshan was considered a rather secure area and other
NGOs and foundations were able to operate effectively with unarmed guards and low
lifestyle footprint. People saw this act of PADCO as the diversion of resources that were
supposed to help them (USAID, 2010b). Thus, this project is noted to be poorly planned
and monitored, not taking into account the realities on the ground and the local ethnic and
cultural factors. Further, due to the poor judgment and decision-making of the PADCO
managers, this project did not receive much support from the local community, which is a
significant factor in a smooth implementation of projects in Afghanistan.
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3. Personnel Competence
As mentioned in the literature part of this study, Afghanistan lost most of its
skilled resources during the three decades of fighting and disturbances, and opportunities
to replenish this gap was missing. This lack of local qualified human capital and the
inexperience of international personnel in an unpredictable and challenging environment
like Afghanistan were felt during the reconstruction and development period of post2002. As mentioned earlier, many of these projects suffered from mismanagement and a
lack of proper quality control and assurance programs, which indicate a lack of
experience and/or knowledge of the field.
In the first case study, both the USAID and LBGI did not carry out an effective
quality control and assurance program. The personnel were not trained properly and as a
result laboratory testing was not done in compliance with standards, which resulted in the
removal of 30 kilometers of asphalt. Consequently, a contract was signed with another
international company for monitory and advisory services in May 2004 (USAID, 2004).
However, the same issue was not experienced in the second case study. This probably
could be as a result of the lessons learned from the first case study.
The third case study had a well prepared proposal demonstrating the experience of
IRD in Afghanistan. However, the management was not structured well to address the
complexity of the project and the realities in the field. Further, although the
subcontractors were selected using the industry norms, but in most cases they were
financially and materially impacted due to underestimating of the Statement of Work of
the project. These subcontractors were responsible both for the design and construction of
the provincial roads. However, the quality of the design and compliance to international
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codes were much higher than what these subcontractors were familiar with. Those
subcontractors who recognized the higher cost liability of this change submitted higher
bids but many subcontractors underbid their projects without fully understanding their
responsibilities. The selection of these lowest bidders resulted in many problems. For
example, the submitted design sets by the subcontractors and their consultants were
rejected multiple times resulting in much delays. In addition, the design data provided to
the subcontractors was in the form of ‘aerial photogrammetric imaging’. However, the
subcontractors had no prior experience with this kind of data and thus it took them two
months to verify this data on the field. In addition, as mentioned previously, this project
suffered from the incompetence of personnel involved, such as lack of jobsite
management and supervision; lack of contingency planning and risk management; limited
capacity of field engineers to adequately supervise subcontractors causing delayed
payments and hence cash-flow problems; and reliance on subcontractors to provide
quality designs (USAID, 2011). All these factors compounded contributed ultimately to
the termination of the project.
Case studies four, five, and six also faced similar issues. The case study four
personnel showed a lack of hands on experience on fruit trees establishment and fruit
orchard management (USAID, 2010a). Similarly, the case study five and six personnel
did not provide these trainings to the farmers which resulted in a reported loss of 15-50%
of saplings for the latter (USAID, 2010c). In the fourth case study, one important facility
missing was the cold storage warehouse for fruits and vegetables. This resulted in
farmers/businesses selling fruits and vegetables cheaper or sending it over the border to
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Pakistan for cold storage to re-sell in the Afghan market during off-season (USAID,
2010a).
The design and quality of infrastructure and buildings of the fifth case study were
particularly egregious. Its roads were of very poor quality, the canals were poorly
constructed, and the root cellars were conducive to fungus. These establishments
rendered useless almost as soon as they were constructed (USAID, 2010b). In the sixth
case study, the short duration of many project activities prevented a lasting impact on the
economy of the region. Many of these activities were not designed to be sustainable
beyond the project conclusion. With no transition plan, the assumption was that the locals
would take over without any technical or financial support. However, this led to the
disappointment of many people involved in this project (USAID, 2010c). Thus, if these
projects and its many activities were planned and monitored properly, not just the local
people but all Afghanistan would have benefited much more than what is possible now.
4. Personnel Turnover
Personnel turnover might have been one of the reasons for some of the projects
not accomplishing its stated objectives. All of the projects, however, did not suffer from
this factor. The first case study project had high rates of staff turnover, which could be
related to the security situation, living conditions, and limited tour of duty. Staff turnover
was the main reason for this project being delayed as the issue of lack of funding was not
addressed on time due to frequent change in key project personnel (USAID, 2006).
Likewise, the third case study project also experienced high turnover of key personnel.
The average tenure of senior managers in this project was 8.3 months. Among these, of
particular concern was the tenure of the Subcontractors Manager, which was 5 months
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(USAID, 2011). The sixth case study project, similarly, had high personnel turnover at
the beginning of the project making it difficult to maintain a focus on the project goals
and objectives (USAID, 2010c). Had staff turnover been lower, the management
problems discussed earlier might have been lesser resulting in better outcomes.
5. Corruption
The literature part of this study mentioned that corruption remains endemic in
Afghanistan, and that there is a lack of political will to tackle it. Further, the donor
community is also blamed for it because of poorly conceived development projects and
weak oversight. In the fifth case study project, PADCO bribed provincial or national
government departments to take premature control of an activity so as to avoid making
repairs to bring the activity up to project standards (USAID, 2010b). In the third case
study project, each subcontractor was required as part of the contract to provide support
facilities for the IRD field staff. However, in some cases, for instance in Kandahar, IRD
engineers lived with the subcontractor’s field staff in the subcontractor’s compound. As
was mentioned earlier, many test results were recorded as being in compliance where in
reality they were not up to standards (USAID, 2010c). So, the living and working
conditions for these engineers were such that it favored the subcontractor.
6. Accountability
The absence of accountability eases the way for corruption and mismanagement.
Were accountability properly practiced in Afghanistan, most of the aforementioned
internal (within the human control) problems could have been prevented or rectified,
resulting in better outcomes. The quality issues in the first case study project resulted in
the removal of 30 kilometers of asphalt causing a delay in the project and wastage of
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resources (USAID, 2004). In the third case study project, the implementing mechanism
was a ‘cooperative agreement’ rather than a ‘contract’. The result was less accountability
and responsiveness to USAID. Therefore, much of the management problems that were
present in this project were not known by USAID within time. Further, as mentioned
above, the IRD field staff was living with the subcontractor’s field staff in their
compound (USAID, 2011). As a result, this literally forced the IRD staff to overlook the
quality issues in the provincial roads for the reason mentioned in the above section.
Similarly, in the fifth case study project, government departments were bribed to take
control of activities that were either incomplete or not in compliance with quality
requirements of the project. In addition, PADCO expended much resource on a high
security footprint and extravagant lifestyle in an area where other organizations were
operating effectively without similar arrangements. Based on the analysis of the
evaluation team for this project, it was stated that much of the work done by PADCO will
not have long-term consequence. Further, the cost-benefit value of the project was
questioned as the estimated value of the benefits was in the order of $40 million for a cost
of $60 million (USAID, 2010b). Thus, a lack or improper enforcement of accountability
resulted in many personnel of these projects to not perform their duties responsibly.
7. Government-Donor Coordination
A lack of Government-Donor coordination has affected the implemented projects
in two ways. First, it has resulted in duplication of efforts and resources in some areas, as
mentioned in the literature part of this study. Second, a lack of involvement of the
government agencies have led to the underdevelopment of skills and capacities of the
government officials and brought to question the sustainability issue of these projects. In
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the fourth case study, the relative government agencies were not involved in the design
and planning of this program (USAID, 2010a). Their inclusion could have provided some
local insight that might have resulted in a better design and planning of the program. In
the fifth case study, the evaluators have expressed their views that the support and
follow-on of the government agencies could have greatly improved the results of the
project. The Baharak Power Canal failed to deliver the water to the power station and
irrigation lands downstream, as mentioned earlier. The officials of this power station
stated their unawareness of the details of the work done in this activity and complained
about the absence of relevant documents that should have been provided to them. The
Director of Water Management said that not only did PADCO not coordinate with his
department but also refused to leave blueprints, specifications, or record of what was
done for the project within his jurisdiction. The Director of Public Works claimed that his
department was wholly ignored despite its obvious jurisdiction over many project
activities. The government officials criticized PADCO for a lack of coordination and
arrogance. PADCO often time remained absent from coordination meetings. As a result
many activities of this project were stated to have no long-term significance (USAID,
2010b). Similarly, in the sixth case study, department of Agriculture and Rural
Rehabilitation and Development indicated some involvement with the project but wished
for more involvement and consultation. The long-term impact and sustainability of this
project was questioned as there was no transition plan after project completion, as it was
assumed that the local government agencies would take over without any further
technical or financial support, which did not turn out to be the case (USAID, 2010c).
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4.7

Chapter Summary

Discussion in this chapter entailed the factors impeding and proving challenging
to the process of reconstruction and development. These factors were identified based on
the interviews carried out with the organizations involved in this process and a number of
case studies of projects implemented on the ground. Brief profiles of the participating
organizations and summaries of the case studies were provided. This was followed by a
analysis of the identified factors discussed in the light of the case studies.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS

“Study the past if you would define the future”.
Confucius (551 BC - 479 BC)
“The greatest challenge to any researcher is stating the problem in a way that will
allow a solution”.
Bertrand Russell (1872 – 1970)

5.1

New Outlooks

The underlying idea of this study was to identify the key factors that would affect
and slow down the reconstruction and development process in a post-conflict zone, in
particular in Afghanistan, through interviews with people involved in this process and
case studies of projects implemented on the ground. This study has discussed and alluded
to the complexity and uncertainty of this process. The different challenges present in a
post-conflict setting – the varying interests and agendas of different countries and
organizations, the capacity of the local institutions, the security and stability uncertainty,
corruption, infrastructure, the unknown and challenging terrain – have proved to be
difficult to the international community to overcome. This has had varying level of
outcomes, however in most cases the stated objectives of the projects and programs were
not achieved entirely.
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The international community has labelled these failures in all development cases
as the lessons learned. This rhetoric has been repeated from time to time; however it
displays a lack of understanding of the situation on the ground and the development
process in general. In the author’s opinion, what the international community tends to
forget is that this reconstruction and development opportunity that the post-conflict state
gets has a limited time frame. Thus, it is imperative to use this window of opportunity in
the best way possible in order to achieve the set goals by the international community and
the aspirations of the post-conflict communities. The international community ought to
know that all the issues in this process are dynamic and interconnected and therefore
requires a holistic approach where all sectors play an equal role in forming the framework
and foundation of an effective and productive development process.
This holistic approach would require a considerable amount of planning on a
micro and macro level to integrate the efforts of all the parties involved in the
reconstruction and development program. This planning would need to identify and
address the numerous factors surrounding this process. The proper assessment of these
factors and their management could sway the projects and programs toward success
contributing to the overall success of the process itself.
If the analysis of the collected data for this study is correct, then the factors
mentioned in the previous chapter would be pivotal to the success or failure of
reconstruction and development program in Afghanistan, and other post-conflict states in
general. This argument may not be something new in this field; however what is really
needed is an alternative way of thinking to better manage this process and the factors
challenging it. The people involved in this process need to step out of the box and their
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comfort zones and start thinking of ways that could produce better outcomes. This would
mean challenging their own knowledge and experience and adapting to the reality on the
ground. This would result in a proactive approach that would take into account the
complexity of the situation and produce results that are more conducive and sustainable.
For the factors identified in this study, the author has presented suggestions in the
following sections that could be used to improve the outcome of these factors. These
suggestions should not be considered independent interventions but rather added
measures to the current endeavors and strategies of the international community and
governments to achieve security, stability, and an improved reconstruction and
development process.
1. Security
The author believes that for lasting peace in Afghanistan, approaches on three
fronts are vital – diplomacy, development, and military. The last decade (2002 – 2012)
has shown that pursuing only military engagement to tackle the insurgency is not a viable
option. Thus there is a need to politically engage these groups. As Barakat et al. (2008)
have suggested, this process will need to involve directly the Afghan government and key
insurgent representatives with any needed assistance from the international community.
Furthermore, key stakeholders would need to be assured that any negotiations with the
insurgents would ultimately be in their favor and contribute to an improved stability of
the region. The international community would need to extend its support to the
government in this process to show that it is a capable and credible partner.
In addition to negotiations with the insurgents, the government needs to engage in
public diplomacy. The traditional structures such as ‘shuras’ (local community councils)

108
are still a functional part of the society in much of Afghanistan. Similarly, the clerics,
mullahs, and imams still hold influence in much of rural areas where illiteracy is the
highest. These figures in general pass message of sorts to the public during the Friday
prayer sermons. Further, they are also conveyors of insurgent messages and in some
cases motivators of insurgency itself. Thus, gaining the support and confidence of these
clerics is important to the government to not only stop the conveyance of the insurgents’
messages but also to persuade the people not to support the insurgents. These people
could also serve as a source of local intelligence reporting the activities of these
insurgents (Barakat et al., 2008).
According to Barakat et al. (2008) many Afghans blame the government for the
grim state of the country. With a lack of unemployment, the young Afghans who make a
larger percentage of the population are a good source of manpower to the insurgents.
Therefore, the government needs to focus on development projects in these rural areas to
meet the local needs and provide life improvement opportunities to these young men. In
addition to employment, for instance in infrastructure, agriculture and livelihood support
programs, these young men could be provided vocational and educational training,
adding up to the skilled workforce of the country. Further, as has been evident from the
case studies, the support of local communities is significant for the implementation of
projects in insecure environments. The local communities can take security measures to
prevent the insurgents from hindering the project work. This would contribute to both the
stability and development of the region. Therefore, the government needs to be clear and
organized in its message and practice, especially in these rural areas. Losing the trust of
these people could result in losing the positive achievements of many years. In order to
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prevent this, the government could also work on raising the awareness of the people
about the civilian fatalities resulting from insurgent attacks. Further, they could be
pointed to the current situation of Iraq where the sectarian violence could prove to be a
powerful lesson to the people.
In the author’s opinion, there are two groups of insurgents. The first are the
moderate elements who are willing to negotiate with the government. These are the
people with whom the Afghan government and the international community have been
recently trying to interact and have dialogues. However, the results have not been very
favorable so far. The second are the hardcore extremists who do not negotiate under any
circumstances. It is therefore necessary to substantially improve the capabilities of the
Afghan security forces to enable them to effectively combat these hardcore insurgents.
Doing so will not only slow down but also downsize the activities and attacks of these
insurgents. This will further put pressure on the less extreme elements of these groups
and, hopefully, bring them closer to the negotiations table.
2. Mismanagement
The author believes that the issue of mismanagement could be categorized into
two categories. The first is mismanagement carried out by people due to negligence of
their duties and responsibilities. Dealing with this type of mismanagement falls under the
subject of accountability and will be discussed in a later section. The second type is
mismanagement due to a lack of experience in new (and insecure) environments, such as
Afghanistan, as has been noted in some of the case studies. Dealing with this type of
mismanagement requires close involvement of the local experts. The involvement of
these local experts from the initiation of a program/project to the completion can provide
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insight into issues of a certain area that others might not be aware of or may foresee.
Having information of some of the upcoming challenges and problems would provide
time to the decision makers to devise ways of managing these risks. Further, coordinating
the project/program plans with the local agencies and involvement of the local
communities would ensure a less problematic and informed implementation process.
One main mismanagement issue that has been noticed in the case studies to have
remarkably affected the projects is the flow of information between the main office and
field personnel. The lynchpin for this issue was noticed to be the centralized structure of
the project hierarchy. Though, centralized structures provide ease in project management,
especially decision making, however these structures render less effective as the project
magnitude increases specifically in uncertain environments, where on time decision
making is imperative to project success. It is in the author’s believe that in such
unpredictable environments a rather dynamic project structure would yield better results.
The project structure should remain flexible for meeting the varying needs of the project
itself. As the project size and uncertainty on the ground increases, decision making
should be made decentralized enabling middle level to senior managers to make on-time
and optimal decisions.
3. Personnel Competence
Developing countries in general suffer from a shortage of qualified human
resources due to substandard educational institutions, among other factors. The state of
post-conflict countries in some cases is even worse in this regard. During the conflict
years the primary goal of people is survival, and as the conflict extends the educated and
more skilled group of people will leave for other countries and the less fortunate, who
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make the larger percentage of population, will stay behind. Due to a dysfunctional or
complete absence of educational institutions a generation of young men and women lose
the opportunity to get the proper education and training to add up to the workforce of the
country, as was the case in Afghanistan. This skill gap proves to be the most critical
challenge during the post-conflict years as it directly affects the growth of the country
and all other development activities.
The international community does have capacity development programs; however
in most cases they are donor-driven with a shorter duration rather than meeting the actual
and long-term needs of the state (Sanyal & Babu, 2012). For this program to be
sustainable and to contribute to sustainable development, it needs to be owned and
managed by the developing country with the international community playing a
supporting role. As each country have a specific set of needs and expectations from these
programs, they need to be flexible and open to modifications as required (Murrell, 1984).
Examples of such models that are endogenous and flexible to the changing demands of
the market are the Botswana National Productivity Center (BNPC), the Rwandan Human
Resources and Institutional Capacity Development Agency (HIDA), and the South
African Technical Assistance Unit (TAU) (Hope, 2009).
Access to technology is becoming more common in the developing countries. In
Afghanistan, an estimated 18 million people have access to cellular phones and 2 million
have access to internet out of an estimated 31 million population (MCIT, 2014).
Technology could be thus used to increase the competence of local workforce. Based on
a personal communication with one of the interviewees (February 10, 2014), it was
suggested that interactive distance education systems could be used to develop the
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capacity of human capital. With the latest developments in communication and
collaborative technologies, expertise and training could be provided to people of all
levels anywhere around the country, for instance using ‘Google Hangout’. These learning
and skill development centers could be established in different regions of the country and
connected to each other through a network. Trainers from one end of the country could
interact with the trainees in another end. This interaction however should be of a practical
nature with dialogue and demonstrations rather than a monologue where the expert only
gives a lecture. Further, as mentioned above, this process should be locally owned i.e. the
knowledge and skill of local trainers be developed and then given the task of training
others. In this manner the activities could be tailored as per the needs of the
institutions/country rather than a specific model provided by the donor community.
This approach of developing competence could be of short to medium term,
however for a long-term approach the author suggests that in addition to improving the
quality of the local educational, vocational and training institutions in collaboration with
the developed countries and international organizations, higher education scholarships be
provided by the developed countries to the young men and women of the country. Of
notice in this regard are the Fulbright and Chevening programs that provide higher
education scholarships to qualified youth of developing countries to further enhance their
knowledge and skill sets in different fields. The author highly emphasizes on the
continuity of such programs and suggests that other developed countries follow a similar
approach to assist boosting the potential of the youth of developing countries, which is
critical in their development.
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4. Personnel Turnover
The author is of the view that the working and living conditions of a developing
country are the core factors for personnel turnover. A lack of proper facilities, the
numerous social and political challenges, and the sheer amount of stress in working in an
uncertain and unpredictable environment challenges the experience, skills, and strength
of an individual every moment. This can be noted in the staff turnover of some of the
case studies. Improvements can be made to these conditions however they will be limited
due to the existing circumstances of the country itself. Incentives could be offered to
qualified personnel; however it is an approach that may or may not achieve desired
results.
The author offers two suggestions in this regard – increased involvement and
employment of qualified local staff and use of technology. Employing local staff to carry
out the work will be more effective and productive since they would have already
adapted to the challenging environment of a particular area. As the turnover rate of these
local staff will be less than other national or expat staff, their presence through a longer
period in the project will ensure better focus on and implementation of the project itself.
A concern here would be the capability of these local personnel. As discussed above,
these personnel could be trained to develop their skills and knowledge level to better
meet the project requirements. The second suggestion is the use of technology between
the head office and field office. One of the reasons for staff turnover is travelling through
insecure areas for project monitoring and evaluation. With the technological
developments of this age, this issue could be resolved. The use of smartphones with
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internet accessibility would enable video-conferencing between the field staff and head
office managers. The field staff could video-conference on a daily basis or as required
with regional or head office managers to report project progress or any existing or
potential problems. Similarly, the regional or head office managers could see the actual
progress of work in the field. This would increase the flow of communication between
the two levels of project staff reducing the decision making time, where required, for the
senior managers.
5. Corruption
There remains no room for doubt that corruption impedes development and the
growth of a country affecting the majority of low-income population by, among others,
spreading hunger and poverty. Corruption, which is endemic to most of the developing
countries, obstructs the social and economic development, as much of the public funds
are banked overseas. Corruption can reduce tax revenues by as much as 50 percent
reducing the funds available for public spending. It ‘reduces the quality of public services
and infrastructure, affects government spending decisions, decreases revenues, and
damages the confidence of the public in the rule of law’ (Otusanya, 2011).
Tackling corruption is a critical challenge to every country, especially a postconflict one. Afghanistan, for instance, ranks the third most corrupt country in the world
(Transparency International, 2014). To deal with the issue of corruption, a number of
approaches could be used. The first could be the establishment of an anti-corruption unit.
This unit managed by reputable members of society should have broad powers and
extensive oversight in the government (Barakat, 2008). Further, it should have the
authority to investigate, interrogate, arrest, and prosecute offenders. In addition, it could

115
also serve as a unit in identifying gaps in the government systems and procedures that are
prone to corruption and recommend reforms in eliminating them. Such anti-corruption
units have shown positive results in countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Malaysia (Siddiquee, 2010).
To ensure the effectiveness of such a unit, public support will be necessary to
report cases of corruption. This could be done in two ways. First, as suggested by one of
the interviewees in a personal communication (February 10, 2014), online services could
be used to report cases of corruption. As mentioned above, technology accessibility is
becoming common in most of the developing countries. Therefore, the use of online
services such as www.ipaidabribe.com, which is currently being used in India and
Pakistan, could be incentivized for public use. Second, the author suggests that as the
majority of the public own cell phones, as is the case in Afghanistan, such corruption
reporting services could be offered through the use of phones. Corruption cases do not
have to be necessarily reported by placing calls to the anti-corruption unit, but rather cell
phone platforms could be developed that would ease the reporting procedure and ensure
the anonymity of the public.
In addition, since most of the corruption cases happen because of a complex and
multi-departmental verification and approval processes, the author believes that provision
of single-window services would significantly reduce it. Similarly, electronic or egovernment would also greatly help contain corruption. E-government which is a system
of governance that has been in use in many developed countries is being implemented in
some of the developing countries, including Afghanistan (MCIT, 2014). E-government
provides digital interaction between the government, the public, and businesses. People
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can complete transactions with the government electronically without having to visit
government offices or meet officials (Siddiquee, 2010). This could reduce corruption to a
great extent. In addition, cell phones could also be used to make payments to the
government offices without interacting with the government officials. A good example in
this regard is the “Mobile Money” services provided in Afghanistan. Prior to the
introduction of Mobile Money, as much as 30 percent of the pay checks of Afghan
teachers and National Police, who were paid in cash, would be skimmed by third party
agents. With Mobile Money now, users receive their pay checks directly in their phones,
which has become a form of electronic wallet that could be used to send money to other
users or pay electricity bills (USAID, 2014).
Furthermore, another approach could be educating the younger generation about
corruption at school and other educational institutions. These efforts should aim at
teaching noble and ethical values to the youth. In addition, anti-corruption officials
should hold dialogues, public campaigns, and seminars to raise awareness of the
detrimental effects of corruption on the society and economy of the country, and
encourage public participation in reporting corruption cases (Siddiquee, 2010).
6. Accountability
Establishment and enforcement of proper accountability measures and systems
can significantly reduce corruption, intentional mismanagement, and misperformance
cases. Accountability is a critical requirement in post-conflict and developing countries if
further social and economic development is desired. Promotion and implementation of
accountability is as an arduous process as that of corruption. To address the issue of
accountability, the author suggests that an accountability office be established. Similar to

117
the anti-corruption unit discussed above, this office be provided with extensive power
and authority to scrutinize the activities of the public officials and other development
actors. Further, the government and the various development agencies’ procurement and
contracting processes be reviewed and evaluated. Similarly, the performance of middle to
high level officials of these organizations and agencies be also assessed. The reports of
all these investigations should be disclosed to the public. This could be done by several
means. First, these reports could be made available on the internet. Since only the
educated and middle to high income group of the population will have access to this
source, these reports should also be published in journals and newspapers available to the
local literate public. In addition, these reports could also be broadcasted on the television
and radios to inform the percentage of population who are illiterate. Raising the
awareness of the public at the societal level about the activities and performance of the
government, development agencies, and their officials will help the public more actively
participate in criticizing and providing feedback about the government, development
agencies and their existing systems.
7. Government-Donor Coordination
Poor government-donor coordination can significantly inhibit effective recovery
and development. It is imperative that all the actors involved in this process integrate and
direct their activities towards a shared-vision driven reconstruction and development
program. This should be a participatory process aiming to gather the input of all
stakeholders and be open to further improvements. To achieve this goal, Barakat and
Zyck (2009) have suggested a model to promote an effective reconstruction and
development program.
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This model which is based on the Bureau of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of
Aceh and Nias (BRR) established in Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami asks for a
highly capable and temporary agency to oversee the process of reconstruction and
development. This agency does not have to be a permanent agency or ministry and
directly engage in the reconstruction and development activities itself. Rather, this
agency should identify the most appropriate implementing partners, ensure compliance
with the central reconstruction and development plan, monitor waste and assess the
impact of interventions on a regular basis. This agency should be free from the influence
of donors or the country and should have the authority to recruit or dismiss personnel as
necessary. Upon completion of the objectives of the reconstruction and development
program, this agency should be disbanded with its personnel employed in the public
sector.
Further, a committee consisting of major donor and civil society representatives
should periodically review the performance of this agency to ensure aid effectiveness,
quality assurance, and accountability to the people of the donor and aid recipient
countries. In addition, community-level feedback mechanisms should be established to
measure the overall satisfaction of the people and to further improve the outputs of the
reconstruction and development program. Such level of participation will give the people
a feeling of belonging to this process which could result in an increased cooperation of
these people further improving the management of some of the issues that were
mentioned earlier in this chapter.
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5.2

Implications for Future Research

Looking back at the literature and findings of this study, a number of issues come
to mind further intriguing the curiosity as a researcher. The subject of post-conflict
reconstruction and development has been revolving around the academicians and field
professionals for years; however there seems to be a gap between the findings of
academic research and the practice in the field. Reading the studies of researchers and
reports of development agencies, there usually is a reference to the failure of
projects/programs labelled as lessons learned. This raises the question as to why there are
repeated failures despite the presence of much literature and experienced field
professionals. It is apparent that there cannot be a general approach to the issue of postconflict reconstruction and development as the situations and circumstances of each
country differ. However, there are commonalities among each case that could serve to
better guide the stakeholders of this process to devise a more effective plan resulting in
reduced failures while being conducive to the long term social, political, structural, and
economic development. Therefore, there is a need to study the findings of both the
academic research and field practice and identify methods to bridge the gap between the
two. Although, attempt was made to achieve this goal in this study, however it is
suggested that a more detailed study of each factor be carried out. Further, identifying
similarities among post-conflict situations and finding the commonalities that could be
extended and used in other cases should be established.
This study identified a total of seven factors contributing to the success or failure
of reconstruction and development projects based on interviews and case studies.
Although, efforts were made to have an all-inclusive group of interviewees from various
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fields and organizations involved in this process, however there were some potential
participants who could not participate in this study due to organizational restrictions.
Thus, it would be interesting to find out if the identified factors presented in this study
would remain indifferent by including a different group of participants. Further, the
selected case studies, though, were from different regions of Afghanistan, yet it did not
completely represent Afghanistan in its entirety. There were no case studies found for
projects that were implemented in central and central-north areas, although these areas
are relatively secure and stable. In addition, all the case studies were projects awarded by
USAID. No case studies of projects awarded and/or implemented by other donor
agencies such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or the UN could be found
for this study. It would be thought-provoking to find project reports of other donors and
compare their performance to those of USAID. The findings of such a comparison should
be fascinating and any difference in this regard should be evaluated against the findings
of this study.
The methodology used in this study was entirely qualitative with no relevance to
any of the quantitative methods. It is yet to be found if the results from a combined
qualitative and quantitative research design would be any different. Quantification of the
identified issues would pave the way for statistical analysis. Using statistical analysis, the
correlation between the issues identified and their significance should be established.
This would further narrow down the major factors in this process, and perhaps provide
the opportunity to work on more detailed strategies to these issues using the expertise of
multi-disciplinary experts.
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Although, this study has attempted to answer some of the questions regarding the
subject of post-conflict reconstruction and development, however at the same time it has
raised many others. As the well-known fiction writer Doris Lessing says:

“That is what learning is. You suddenly understand something you've understood
all your life, but in a new way.” (The Four-Gated City, 1969)
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Appendix B. Delphi Second Round Questions

I.

Interviewee A
1. The capacity of the Afghan government is said to be underdeveloped
(Understanding Afghanistan, Falling Short). How effective do you think
Public Private Partnerships would prove to be? What challenges would local
or western private sectors face in such an initiative?
2. What tax issues do construction and development companies face currently?
How could the Afghan government or the international community make
improvements in this regard?
3. Afghanistan is a volatile and high-risk zone which could discourage the
western private sector to invest. According to the World Bank’s Doing
Business Index, Afghanistan ranks 164 out of 189 economies in the ease of
doing business. What incentives could the Afghan government and the
international community offer to attract the western private sector?
4. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be?

II.

Interviewee B
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned that some of the constraints
facing Foreign Direct Investments are political instability, security,
corruption, and lack of capacity. How could the government encourage
investors and businesses to invest/continue investing in Afghanistan despite
these challenges?
2. What variables could prove to be successful in forming a Public Private
Partnership? What challenges could prove to be obstacles in such an
initiative?
3. Many businesses are discouraged because of a lack of institutions providing
line of credit and surety bonds. According to the World Bank’s Doing
Business Index, Afghanistan ranks 130 out of 189 economies in terms of
getting credit. This could be an incentive to attract foreign businesses. What
have been the government’s efforts in this regard?
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4. You have mentioned that to formalize the economy, more focus should be on
SMEs. However, with a decline in foreign aid and increase in competition
among businesses, some SMEs will be forced to closure and the political &
security uncertainty will limit the growth of the others. How could such a
program be made viable?
5. In the Development Cooperation Report of 2010 by the Ministry of Finance, it
is stated that donor coordination is less than satisfactory, resulting in
fragmentation of aid, duplication of programs, and unbalanced and inequitable
development. What do you think are the underlying reasons for this lack of
coordination? Do you see any improvements in this regard beyond 2014?
6. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be?
III.

Interviewee C
1. It is argued that one of the reasons for the weaker government institutions and
low capacity personnel is the exclusion of the government institutions from
many, if not all, of the reconstruction and development projects implemented
by the international community and development agencies, along with higher
salaries offered by these organizations attracting qualified Afghans (as stated
in the Development Cooperation Report of 2010). What are your thoughts on
this subject? Is the international community responsible for the weaker
government institutions and low capacity personnel?
2. Could you provide an example of the ‘administrative bureaucracy’ you have
mentioned in response to question 2? Do you think this issue will remain the
same or improve beyond 2014?
3. Stability programs such SIKA are contended to be less conducive to the
overall development and economic prosperity of a region as they are to meet,
mainly, military objectives (Development Cooperation Report of 2010, The
Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery). What are your thoughts in this regard?
Should the international community and the Afghan government continue
supporting such programs?
4. In response to question 2, you have mentioned that some developing programs
were designed without proper consultation of the government counterparts.
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What is the level of incoordination and communication between the
government and the international community with respect to project/program
design, planning, and implementation? What has been the impact of this on
implemented projects/programs?
5. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be?
IV.

Interviewee D
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned that the government was not
able to effectively utilize the foreign assistance since 2002. What do you think
are the underlying reasons? Do you think this trend will change beyond 2014?
2. As mentioned in your response to question 2, in addition to limited budget and
security challenges, what other factors could hamper successful
project/program implementation in the recent future?
3. With all the challenges present in doing business in Afghanistan, as mentioned
in your responses, how do you think the international community and the
government could encourage the national and international private sector to
invest/continue investing in Afghanistan?
4. With a decline in businesses and available opportunities post-2014, as
mentioned in your response to question 1, it could be inferred that the pool of
qualified human capital will increase. What impact will this have on the
government institutions and the international organizations, and their planned
reconstruction and development programs/projects?
5. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be?

V.

Interviewee E
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned that the investment risk is
perceived fairly high and has made investors hesitant to make any
commitments. Although, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business
Index, Afghanistan has been improving its business environment, how else do
you think the Afghan government and the international community could
encourage the investors to invest/continue investing in Afghanistan?
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2. What do you think are the underlying reasons for the incompetence and
corruption of the government agencies, as mentioned in your response to
question 2? Do you think there will be any improvements in this regard
beyond 2014?
3. The Afghan government has repeatedly asked for the donor funds to be
channeled through the government agencies to build the much needed
experience in order to take lead of the projects/programs in Afghanistan (DCR
2010, DCR 2012). A significant reduction in the involvement of donors and
stronger channeling of donor funds through government agencies, as
mentioned in your response to question 2, could be interpreted as the
government agencies having developed the capacity to handle these affairs.
How effective do you think this change will be? What would be its impact on
projects/programs in the recent future?
4. With a reduced availability of contracts for international and national
organizations, as mentioned in your response to question 2, it could be
deduced that a pool of qualified human capital will become available in the
market. Do you think there will be any difference in the planning,
implementation, and handling of programs/projects by the government
agencies and international community post-2014 with such a change?
5. How would you evaluate the current management and technical skills of
Afghan personnel working in the public sector against those working in the
private sector? Do you see any improvements in this regard?
6. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be?
VI.

Interviewee F
1. Would it be correct to say that one of the reasons there is very little western
corporate interest in exploring Afghanistan is the lack of focus on and
understanding the local business environment as has been mentioned in your
response to question 1? How could the Afghan government and the
international community attract the western corporates to invest in
Afghanistan?
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2. The capacity of the Afghan government is said to be underdeveloped
(Understanding Afghanistan, Falling Short). How effective do you think
Public Private Partnerships would prove to be? What challenges would local
or western private sectors face in such an initiative?
3. In response to question 2, you have mentioned that the donor nations have
trained the Afghan contractors and subcontractors to expect large sums of
money for projects with low expectations. What are the underlying reasons for
this action? What has been the outcome as a result?
4. In a report by the International Crisis Group, it has been mentioned that a
considerable portion of the aid has gone to waste because of poor
programming, evaluation and oversight, corruption and strategic disconnect.
Who would you say is responsible for this, the Afghan government or the
donor community? Why?
5. In the Development Cooperation Report of 2010 by the Ministry of Finance, it
is stated that donor coordination is less than satisfactory, resulting in
fragmentation of aid, duplication of programs, and unbalanced and inequitable
development. What do you think are the underlying reasons for this lack of
coordination? Do you see any improvements in this regard beyond 2014?
6. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be?
VII.

Interviewee G
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned lack of experienced national
and international contractors as an obstacle. Afghanistan is a volatile and
high-risk zone which could discourage many national and international
companies to do business in. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business
Index, Afghanistan ranks 164 out of 189 economies in the ease of doing
business. How do you think the Afghan government and the international
community could encourage these businesses to work in Afghanistan? What
incentives could attract them?
2. Low quality of construction materials is mentioned as an issue, in your
response to question 1. What measures could the government and private
sector take to improve this process?
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3. How would you evaluate the current management and technical skills of
Afghan personnel working in the public sector against those working in the
private sector? Do you see any improvements in this regard?
4. In the Development Cooperation Report of 2010 by the Ministry of Finance, it
is stated that donor coordination is less than satisfactory, resulting in
fragmentation of aid, duplication of programs, and unbalanced and inequitable
development. How would you evaluate the coordination between the donor
agencies themselves and the donor agencies and the government? How do you
see the project/program planning and coordination between these two bodies
i.e. the government and the international community/organizations beyond
2014?
5. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be?
VIII.

Interviewee H
1. How would you evaluate the current management and technical skills of
Afghan personnel working in the public sector against those working in the
private sector? With skilled human resources mentioned as an issue in your
response to question 1 and 2, what measures, in addition to the use of media
and technology, could yield improvements in this regard?
2. You have mentioned access to finance as an obstacle, in response to question
1 and 2. However, based on a commercial guide to US companies prepared by
the US Department of Commerce, there are US and non-US organizations
such as OPIC, IFC, USTDA and so forth that provide access to finance to
companies looking to start or grow their businesses in Afghanistan. How
would you evaluate the services of these organizations in terms of business
growth or program funding in Afghanistan? Are there any particular issues or
limitations that could discourage businesses to use the services of these
organizations?
3. What kind of incentives do you think could attract more businesses and
investors to Afghanistan?
4. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be?
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IX.

Interviewee I
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned unavailability of the
international organizations and consulting firms as potential obstacles due to,
mainly, insecurity and lack of funds. How could the government and the
international community encourage these organizations and firms to continue
working in Afghanistan despite these challenges? What incentives could
attract them?
2. How would you evaluate the current management and technical skills of
Afghan personnel working in the public sector against those working in the
private sector? With technical human resources mentioned as an issue in your
response to question 1, what measures could yield improvements in this
regard?
3. In response to question 2, you have mentioned that if the development trend
becomes negative and the economic development gets slower, the country will
face instability. How would you evaluate the role of the extractive industry in
this regard which has been estimated in trillions of dollars?
4. With the reduction of funds and downsizing of organizations and firms, it
could be deduced that a pool of qualified human capital will become available
in the market. How do you think will this development affect the output of the
government and other local and international organizations? What changes
could be expected in the implemented projects/programs?
5. In the Development Cooperation Report of 2010 by the Ministry of Finance, it
is stated that donor coordination is less than satisfactory, resulting in
fragmentation of aid, duplication of programs, and unbalanced and inequitable
development. How would you evaluate the coordination between the donor
agencies themselves and the donor agencies and the government? How do you
see the project/program planning and coordination between these two bodies
i.e. the government and the international community/organizations beyond
2014?
6. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be?

Appendix C. Terms and Phrases Used by the Participants to Describe Issues
INTERVIEWEE

A
International Private
Sector
Public Private
Partnership

Reduction in Aid

Weaker Institutions

Dependence on Aid

Investment Risk

Revenue Collection

Qualified Human
Capital

Poor Economy

Reluctance of Investors

3

Corruption

Political Instability

Insecurity

Down Turn in Economy

4

Tax Reform

Foreign Direct
Investment

Incapacity of
Government

Incapacity of
Government
Reluctance of Investors

Reduction in Contracts

5

Procurement
Transparency

Security Challenges

Administrative
Bureaucracy

Limited Budget of
International
Organizations

Incompetence of
Government

6

Credit Problems

Corruption

Security Challenges

Corruption

7

Lack of Development
Budget

Unemployment

Qualified Human
Capital

Accountability

Good Policies

Instability/Insecurity

Lack of Planning (Govt)
Lack of Coordination
(Govt)
Project Design Problems
(Govt)

Political Risk Insurance

1

MENTIONED ISSUES

2

B

9

Qualified Human
Capital
Weak Law Enforcement

10

Economic Growth

8

11
12
13

Public Private
Partnership
Weaker Govt.
Institutions
Judiciary Reforms

C

Lack of Communication
(Donors)
Lack of Coordination
(Donors)
Lack of Law
Enforcement

D

Corruption
Lack of Public Private
Partnership

E

Patronage
Capacity Building
Employment
Opportunities
Qualified Individuals
Leaving Country

14
15
16
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INTERVIEWEE

MENTIONED ISSUES

1

F
Lack of Understanding the
Business Environment

2

US Corporate Interest

3

Lack of Funding

4

G

H

I

Security Challenges

Security Challenges

Security Challenges

Qualified Human Capital

Qualified Human Capital

Access Difficulty
(Infrastructure)

Corruption

Lack of Funding

Lack of Legal Framework

Low Quality Material
Resources
Government Capacity

Access to Finance/Credit

Qualified Human Capital

5

Lack of Transparency

Government Accountability

Foreign Investment

6

Corruption

Establishment of Factories

7

Public Private Partnership

Incentives to Govt. Personnel

Lack of Material Resources
Monitoring Problems
(Consulting Firms)
Economic Development

8

Contractors Capacity

Corruption

Unemployment

9

Business Risk

Donors Coordination

10

Instability

Education System

11

Security Challenges

Instability
Reduction in International
Companies/Orgs
Government Capacity

12

Enforcement of Law

Private Sector Investment

13

Business Investment Reforms

Enacting Laws & Rules

14

Government Function

Transparency (Govt)

15
16

Increasing Domestic Revenues
Legislative & Administrative
Reforms
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Appendix D. Categorization of the Issues Mentioned by the Participants
OVERARCHING
ISSUES
1
2
3
4
5

ISSUES MENTIONED AS

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Insecurity

Qualified
Human Capital
Qualified
Human Capital
Education
System
Contractors
Capacity
Capacity
Building
Monitoring
Problems

Government
Capacity
Incapacity of
Government
Lack of Planning
Lack of
Coordination
Project Design
Problems
Weaker
Institutions
Lack of Law
Enforcement
Incompetence of
Government
Weak Law
Enforcement
Weaker Govt.
Institutions
Government
Capacity
Enacting Laws &
Rules
Lack of Legal
Framework
Enforcement of
Law
Government
Function

Investment Risk

Corruption

Reluctance of Investors

Corruption

Lack of Public Private
Partnership

Administrative
Bureaucracy
Incentives to
Govt. Personnel

International Private Sector
Public Private Partnership

Patronage

Development Budget
Reduction
Limited Budget of
International Orgs.
Lack of Development
Budget
Reduction in Contracts
Reduction in Aid

Credit Problems

Lack of Funding

Investment Risk

Reduction in International
Companies/Orgs.

Instability
Political Risk Insurance
Political Instability
Foreign Direct Investment
Access to Finance/Credit
Foreign Investment
Access Difficulty
(Infrastructure)
Private Sector Investment
Low Quality Material
Resources
Lack of Understanding the
Business Environment
Business Risk
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17

Security
Challenge
Security
Challenge

ISSUES MENTIONED AS

OVERARCHING
ISSUES

Economic Growth

Policy Reforms

1

Dependence on Aid

Business Investment
Reforms

2

Lack of Understanding the
Business Environment

Legislative &
Administrative Reforms

3

US Corporate Interest

Judiciary Reforms

4

Public Private Partnership

Tax Reforms

5

Business Investment Reforms

Good Policies

6

Establishment of Factories

7

Economic Development

8

Unemployment

9

Private Sector Investment

10

Increasing Domestic
Revenues

11

Foreign Investment

12
13
14
15

Revenue Collection
Economic Growth
Down Turn in Economy
Employment Opportunities
Qualified Individuals Leaving
Country
Poor Economy

16
17

Transparency &
Accountability
Lack of
Transparency
Enforcement of Law
Government
Function
Government
Accountability
Enacting Laws &
Rules
Transparency (Govt)
Weak Law
Enforcement
Patronage
Administrative
Bureaucracy
Lack of Law
Enforcement
Procurement
Transparency
Accountability

Government-Donor
Coordination
Donors Coordination
Lack of
Communication
(Donors)
Lack of Coordination
(Donors)

Turnover
Qualified Individuals
Leaving Country
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